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THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT FOR 
PROVIDING EDUCATION, TREATMENT, AND  
COMMUNITY SERVICES FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: 
RETHINKING THE CONCEPT 
Donald H. Stone* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Persons with disabilities seek acceptance and connection in 
society.  From individuals with mental illness, children with 
intellectual disabilities, and wheelchair users, all desire integration 
rather than isolation, mainstreaming rather than segregation.  In fact, 
the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 (hereinafter “ADA”),1 the 
landmark civil rights act protecting persons with a physical or mental 
impairment, has a stated purpose that recognizes the right to fully 
participate in all aspects of society.2  Discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities is all too frequently found in housing, 
education, institutionalization and access to public services.3  At the 
cornerstone of disability protection is the concept of providing services 
in the least restrictive environment (hereinafter “LRE”), or the most 
integrated setting appropriate, known as the mainstreaming concept.4  
In the involuntary confinement of the allegedly dangerously 
mentally ill, the education of the child with disabilities, and the 
location of community group homes for the intellectually disabled, 
 
* Donald H. Stone, Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law, B.A. Rutgers 
University; J.D. Temple University School of Law.  I dedicate this Article to my late father, 
Gerald Paul Stone, a person who battled mental illness his whole life with determination and 
courage.  I gratefully acknowledge my research assistant, Sarah Simmons, a 2019 graduate of 
the University of Baltimore School of Law, for her exceptional legal research in the 
preparation of this article. 
1 Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
12213). 
2 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2018). 
3 Id. § 12101(a)(3). 
4 See infra notes 47-63 and accompanying text.  
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disability advocates have sought integration and mainstreaming as a 
common theme.  Why is the mainstreaming approach to persons with 
disabilities such a prevalent concept?  Are persons with disabilities 
always appropriately served utilizing a strict mainstream approach?  
Are educational institutions using the least restrictive environment to 
underfund educational programs?  Are psychiatric hospitals abiding by 
the requirement that in-patient hospitalization be provided only if a less 
restrictive alternative is not appropriate? 
This Article will discuss and analyze the LRE concept 
prevalent in the ADA and the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act (hereinafter “IDEA”),5 as well as state laws as they relate to the 
involuntary civil commitment of the mentally ill and community based 
treatment for persons with disabilities.  A historical perspective of the 
least restrictive environment will be examined.  An exploration of the 
various uses of the least restrictive environment in civil commitment 
laws, special education, group homes and community based treatment, 
guardianships, and architectural accessibility will occur.  A new 
approach to the least restrictive environment will be offered with 
recommendations for service providers, educational institutions, and 
government entities. 
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE 
ENVIRONMENT  
The bedrock principle of disability law, the least restrictive 
environment, has appeared in court decisions and legislation for more 
than fifty years.6  The concept finds its roots in the civil rights 
movement and court decisions of the 1950s and 60s, which set the 
stage for the desire for equality for all persons regardless of race, 
gender, or disability.7  The LRE has been expressed in a variety of 
ways, however its origins can ultimately be traced back to due process 
 
5 Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (2004) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-
1487).  
6 See infra notes 7-27 and accompanying text.  
7 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  Although dealing with 
racial equality, Brown influenced disability rights as well as “led the way to a growing 
understanding that all people, regardless of race, gender or disability, have a right to a public 
education.”  Kelli J. Esteves & Shaila Rao, The Evolution of Special Education, PRINCIPAL 
(Nov./Dec. 2008), https://www.naesp.org/sites/default/files/resources/1/Principal/2008/N-O 
web2.pdf.  
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concerns addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Shelton v. Tucker in 
1960.8  The Shelton Court explained, 
[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate 
and substantial, the purpose cannot be pursued by 
means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties 
when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The 
breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed in 
the light of the less drastic means for achieving the 
same basic purpose.9 
The foundation of the LRE doctrine (noted by the Court as the 
“less drastic means”) was illustrated in this case involving an Arkansas 
statute which compelled school teachers, as a condition of employment 
in a state-supported school or college, to file an affidavit listing every 
organization they belonged or contributed to in the past five years.10  
The Shelton Court declared this statute invalid as a violation of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.11  While not directly 
relating to disability law, this language laid the foundation for the LRE 
principle. 
The LRE concept in the education arena can be traced back to 
the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975,12 renamed 
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) in 2004.13  In 
the IDEA, the least restrictive environment is a guiding principle and 
is described as,   
[T]o the maximum extent appropriate, children with 
disabilities . . . are educated with children who are not 
disabled, and special classes, separate schooling, or 
other removal of children with disabilities from the 
regular educational environment occurs only when the 
nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that 
 
8 364 U.S. 479 (1960).  Eric D. Paulsrud, The Least Restrictive Alternative: A Theory of 
Justice for the Mentally Retarded, 10 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 465, 488 (1987).  
9 Id. at 488 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).  
10 Id. at 480. 
11 Id. at 490. 
12 Pub. L. No. 94-142, 29 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-
1411).  
13 Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (2004) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-
1487); Brian L. Porto, Application of 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(5), Least Restrictive Environment 
Provision of Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400 et seq., 
189 A.L.R. Fed. 297 (2003).  
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education in regular classroom with the use of 
supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved 
satisfactorily.14 
The IDEA findings assert that education of children with 
disabilities can be made more effective by ensuring access to the 
general educational curriculum in the regular classroom to the 
maximum extent possible.15  Such a strong edict to focus the dialogue 
on educational placement in the regular classroom will be challenged 
in this Article, exploring a new alternative to the discussion between 
school officials and the parents of disabled children.  
The ADA also speaks volumes on the right to fully participate 
in all aspects of society,16 with the goal of equality of opportunity,17 
full participation,18 and the mandate that a public accommodation 
“shall afford goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and 
accommodations to an individual with a disability in the most 
integrated setting appropriate to the needs of the individual.”19  In 
addition, the ADA prevents a qualified individual with a disability 
from being excluded from participating in services, programs, or 
activities of a public entity.20  Furthermore, different or separate 
services may not be provided “unless such action is necessary to 
provide qualified individuals with disabilities with aids, benefits, or 
services that are as effective as those provided to others.”21  This notion 
of an integrated setting forms the basis of the LRE, the domain of first 
choice.  
In the context of the involuntary civil commitment of a person 
with a mental illness who is allegedly dangerous to himself or others, 
state statutes have also utilized the LRE criteria as one of the necessary 
elements to secure in-patient psychiatric hospitalization.22  In 
Maryland, for example, a key element for involuntary admission is that 
there is “no available less restrictive form of intervention that is 
 
14 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2018). 
15 Id. § 1400(c)(5)(A). 
16 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2018). 
17 Id. § 12101(a)(7). 
18 Id.  
19 28 C.F.R. § 36.203(a) (2018); id. § 36.104 (defining a public accommodation as a 
“facility operated by a private entity whose operations affect commerce”). 
20 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (defining public entity as a state or local government).  
21 Id. § 35.130(b)(1)(iv).  
22 See infra Appendix A. 
4
Touro Law Review, Vol. 35 [2019], No. 1, Art. 20
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol35/iss1/20
2019 LEAST RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT 527 
consistent with the welfare and safety of the individual.”23  This Article 
will examine this concept and make recommendations that mandate 
greater responsibility directed to state mental health officials. 
In the context of community based treatment preference, rather 
than institutionalization, the U.S. Supreme Court, in its landmark case 
of Olmstead v. L.C., prohibited unjustified segregation of persons with 
disabilities, describing it as a “form of discrimination.”24  The Court 
noted that the ADA requires public entities to avoid institutional 
settings and “to secure opportunities for people with developmental 
disabilities to enjoy the benefits of community living,”25 as 
institutional confinement “severely diminishes the everyday life 
activities of individuals.”26  The affirmation for placing individuals 
with mental disabilities in less restrictive settings affirms the ADA 
mandate of full participation in all aspects of society.27  This has led to 
significantly more community based mental health services and 
housing opportunities.  
In the context of guardianship law, a legal guardian owes a duty 
to make every reasonable effort to ensure that the placement of his or 
her ward is the least restrictive alternative.28  The varied ways in which 
the least restrictive setting is included in disability law, from access to 
services, education, community based treatment, and guardianship 
duties, demonstrates the powerful doctrine so prevalent in society 
today.  Whether the term is “least restrictive environment,” “least 
restrictive alternative,” or “least restrictive setting,” one thing is clear; 
the mandate of inclusion of the disabled into all aspects of society is a 
fundamental guiding principle of disability law.  
 
 
 
23 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 10-632(e)(2)(v) (West 2018).  
24 527 U.S. 581, 599-600 (1999).  
25 Id. at 599. 
26 Id. at 601. 
27 Id. at 587. 
28 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-2628(a)(1) (2018) (“When establishing the ward’s 
place of abode, a guardian shall make every reasonable effort to ensure that the placement is 
the least restrictive alternative.”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 3-1-206(a)(i)-(ii) (2018) (ensuring that 
the ward under guardianship “shall have the right to: (i) The least restrictive and most 
appropriate guardianship or conservatorship suitable to the ward’s circumstances” applying to 
“residential, educational and employment environments”); ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.316 (2018) 
(“[T]he guardian . . . shall assure that the ward has a place of abode in the least restrictive 
setting consistent with the essential requirements for the ward’s physical health and safety.”). 
5
Stone: Least Restrictive Environment
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2019
528 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 35 
III. THE DEFINITION OF THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE 
ALTERNATIVE CONCEPT 
When Congress announced its motivation for enacting the 
ADA, it recognized that physical and mental disabilities in no way 
diminish a person’s right to fully participate in all aspects of society.29  
In the ADA regulations addressing public entities, state or local 
governments must not provide different or separate services to 
individuals with disabilities “unless such action is necessary.”30  
Similarly, in the ADA regulations addressing public accommodations, 
an individual with a disability cannot be provided with services that 
are different or separate unless such action is necessary.31  In addition, 
such services shall be afforded “in the most integrated setting 
appropriate to the needs of the individual.”32 
In the context of special education services for children with a 
disability, Congress seeks full participation33 and maintains that 
education can be made more effective by “ensuring their access to the 
general education curriculum in the regular classroom[] to the 
maximum extent possible.”34  Furthermore, the regulations 
acknowledge that education can be made more effective by “providing 
appropriate special education and related services, and aids and 
supports in the regular classroom, to such children, whenever 
appropriate.”35  This mainstream focus, i.e., educating children with a 
disability in the regular classroom, is the centerpiece of the IDEA.36  
This focus will be challenged as part of this Article.  
For the involuntary civil commitment of persons with mental 
illness, almost all relevant state statutes contain a consideration of the 
LRE principle in one form or another.37  For instance, the New Jersey 
statute delineates a requirement that “[i]n determining the commitment 
placement, the court shall consider the least restrictive environment for 
the patient to receive . . . treatment that would ameliorate the danger 
 
29 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2018).  
30 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(iv) (2018). 
31 Id. § 36.104 (public accommodations include a “facility operated by a private entity 
whose operations affect commerce” and fall within twelve distinct categories); id. § 36.202.  
32 Id. § 36.203(a).  
33 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1) (2018). 
34 Id. § 1400(c)(5)(A).  
35 Id. § 1400(c)(5)(D).  
36 See id. § 1400.  
37 See infra Appendix A. 
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posed by the patient and provide the patient with appropriate 
treatment.”38  The New Jersey civil commitment statute further defines 
the term “least restrictive environment” as, “the available setting and 
form of treatment that appropriately addresses a person’s need for care 
and the need to respond to dangers to the person, others or property 
and respects, to the greatest extent practicable, the person’s interests in 
freedom of movement and self-direction.”39 
The Pennsylvania Administrative Code provides a similarly 
comprehensive description of the least restrictive alternative, focusing 
on the placement or status being “available and appropriate.”40  These 
limiting concepts whereby the least restrictive alternative must be 
available will be another key focus of this Article, and requiring the 
creation of less restrictive settings as a mandate will be explored.  
The LRE concept is also articulated in state guardianship laws.  
In Maryland, for instance, a guardian of a person is appointed by the 
court for a disabled person for decisions involving “health care, food, 
clothing, or shelter” when “no less restrictive form of intervention is 
available which is consistent with the person’s welfare and safety.”41 
IV. COURT APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LRE 
In Olmstead v. L.C., the U.S. Supreme Court announced, in no 
uncertain terms, the preference for the less restrictive setting, and 
highlighted the benefits of community living over institutions for 
persons with mental disabilities.42  The ADA, according to the Court, 
identifies “unjustified ‘segregation’ of persons with disabilities as a 
‘for[m] of discrimination,’” criticizing unjustified segregation as 
perpetuating unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated are 
incapable or unworthy of participating in community life.43  
Furthermore, the Court recognized that institutional confinement 
 
38 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.15a(a) (West 2018). 
39 Id. § 30:4-27.2(gg).  
40 55 PA. CODE § 5100.2 (2018) (“The least restrictive placement or status available and 
appropriate to meet the needs of the patient and includes both restrictions on personal liberty 
and the proximity of the treatment facility to the person’s natural environment.”).  
41 MD. CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-705(b) (West 2018).  
42 527 U.S. 581, 582 (1999). 
43 Id. at 600 (alteration in original) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2)).  
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“severely diminishes everyday life activities of individuals.”44  The 
Olmstead decision is foundational in various areas of disability law.   
A. Special Education  
The courts have on several occasions highlighted the least 
restrictive setting in the special education arena.  In the leading case of 
Sacramento City Unified School District, Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H., 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit heard the demands for 
placement in the regular classroom by parents of a child with 
intellectual disabilities.45  The Court recognized the IDEA’s preference 
for educating children with disabilities in regular classrooms with their 
peers.46  The Court held the appropriate test in determining compliance 
with the IDEA’s mainstream requirement was a four factor balancing 
test, “(1) the educational benefits of placement full-time in a regular 
class; (2) the non-academic benefits of such placement; (3) the effect 
[the child with the disability] had on the teacher and children in the 
regular class; and (4) the cost of mainstreaming [the child].”47  These 
four factors were identified as considerations the school division must 
take into account when determining if the disabled child’s least 
restrictive environment is appropriate.48  
The debate between educational placement in the regular or 
special education setting was also confronted previously in 1989 by 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Daniel R.R. v. State 
Board of Education, whereby the court recognized that the 
conversation must shift to requiring schools to offer a “continuum of 
alternative placements.”49  In determining compliance with the 
mainstreaming requirement, the Daniel R.R. court held that the 
Education of the Handicapped Act (hereinafter “EHA”), the precursor 
to the IDEA, did not contemplate an all-or-nothing educational setting 
 
44 Id. at 601.  “[E]veryday life activities” include “family relations, social contacts, work 
options, economic independence, educational advancement, and cultural enrichment.”  Id. 
45 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing how the child’s proposed placement, as affected 
by the school division, wrongly necessitated the child to move between the regular classroom 
and the special education section six times each day). 
46 Id. at 1403. 
47 Id. at 1404.  See Murray v. Montrose Cty. Sch. Dist., 51 F.3d 921, 929 (1995) (holding 
that the IDEA’s LRE requirement contains a preference for placement in neighborhood school, 
but not a mandate).  
48 Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., 14 F.3d at 1404.  
49 874 F.2d 1036, 1043 (5th Cir. 1989).  
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of the regular or special education program, but rather a continuum of 
services.50  
Building upon previous court interpretations of the 
mainstreaming principle, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit in Oberti v. Board of Education of the Borough of Clementon 
School District provided another set of factors in evaluating the 
appropriate educational placement.51  This includes evaluating the 
steps that the school has taken to include the child in a regular 
classroom, as the continuum must include supplementary services such 
as a “resource room or itinerant instruction” to expand options beyond 
the regular classroom.52  A second factor is evaluating the educational 
benefits the child will receive in the regular classroom as compared to 
the special education classroom.53  The third factor is an evaluation of 
the “possible negative effect the child’s inclusion may have on the 
education of the other children in the regular classroom.”54  
After considering these factors, if the court determines that the 
school district was justified in removing the child from the regular 
classroom and providing education in a segregated special education 
class, the court must then consider whether the school has included the 
child in school programs with nondisabled children to the maximum 
extent appropriate.55  This is where the IDEA would mandate schools 
 
50 Id. at 1050 (noting that the appropriate mix of placement options will vary from child to 
child).  See 34 C.F.R. § 300.551 (2018) (requiring a continuum of alternative placements).  
51 995 F.2d 1204, 1217-18 (3d Cir. 1993) (involving an eight year-old with Down’s 
Syndrome who was removed from the regular classroom by school officials and placed in a 
segregated special education classroom).  
52 Id. at 1215 (footnote omitted) (quoting Greer ex rel. Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 
F.2d 688, 696 (11th Cir. 1991)).  The determination should be made as to “whether the school 
district has made reasonable efforts to accommodate the children in the regular classroom.”  
Id. at 1217.  
53 Id. (referring to the special education classroom as “segregated,” implying a less than 
desirable placement option).  “[I]n making this comparison the court must pay special attention 
to those unique benefits the child may obtain from integration in a regular classroom which 
cannot be achieved in a segregated environment, i.e., the development of social and 
communication skills from interaction with nondisabled peers.”  Id. at 1216.  
54 Id. at 1217 (emphasizing “that in considering the possible negative effect of the child’s 
presence on the other students, the court must keep in mind the school’s obligation under the 
[IDEA] to provide supplementary aids and services to accommodate the child’s disabilities”).  
55 Id. at 1218.  See S.H. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. of the City of Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 
272 (3d Cir. 2003) (adopting a two-prong test to determine whether the school district has 
satisfied the mainstreaming requirement: 1) can the school educate the child in the “regular 
classroom with use of supplementary aids and services,” and 2) if not, has “the school 
mainstream[ed] the child to the maximum extent possible.” (citing Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1215)).  
9
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provide a continuum of alternative placements to meet the needs of the 
disabled child.56 
On the other hand, there have also been courts that have 
questioned the strong preference for education in the regular 
classroom.  In M.A. ex rel. G.A. v. Voorhees Township Board of 
Education, the placement of a child with autism in an out-of-district 
placement was viewed as the least restrictive setting, running contrary 
to the strong emphasis on education in the regular classroom.57  The 
school division successfully argued that the child’s out-of-district 
placement was the least restrictive environment in which to receive a 
free and appropriate education.58  The child’s current education 
involved mainstreaming in homeroom, art, gym, and lunch; however, 
the court recognized that the disabled child had minimal to no real 
interaction with other peers, something one would expect in the regular 
classroom setting.59  Accordingly, the court acknowledged that the 
child was not receiving a meaningful educational benefit and that 
education at an out-of-district school for children with special needs 
comports with the IDEA, and that the child would receive a free and 
appropriate education in the LRE through the out-of-district 
placement.60  The court cared greatly about the provision of a “free and 
appropriate education” (hereinafter “FAPE”), although such an 
education may not always be provided in the LRE.61  
In Hartmann ex rel. Hartmann v. Loudoun County Board of 
Education, an eleven year old autistic child’s parents were seeking 
education in the regular classroom and disputed evidence of no 
academic progress shown in the regular classroom.62  The Fourth 
Circuit recognized the IDEA’s mainstreaming presumption not as an 
inflexible federal mandate, and pointed out that disabled children are 
 
56 Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1218 (holding that the appropriate mix between regular and special 
education setting “will vary from child to child and . . . from school year to school year as the 
child develops” (quoting Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1050 (5th Cir. 
1989)). 
57 202 F. Supp. 2d 345, 369-70 (D.N.J. 2002).  
58 Id. at 370. 
59 Id. at 366 (discussing that experts for the parents acknowledged that the child was 
receiving “parallel skill development”).  
60 Id. at 368-69.  See Roncker ex rel. Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 
1983) (discussing a preference in favor of mainstreaming).  
61 M.A. ex rel. G.A., 202 F. Supp. 2d at 361-62. 
62 118 F.3d 996, 1000 (4th Cir. 1997) (explaining that the school recommended placement 
in a class of five autistic students, a teacher, and an aid in a regular elementary school which 
would allow for mainstreaming in art, music, gym, literacy, and recess).  
10
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to be educated with non-disabled children only to the maximum extent 
appropriate.63  This flexibility, inherent in the IDEA placement 
provision, is often sorely misinterpreted to pigeonhole disabled 
children inappropriately into the regular classroom. 
Public schools responsible for educating disabled children 
should fully explore an array of placement alternatives before simply 
settling on educating the disabled child in the regular classroom.  There 
is a more complex examination necessary before blindly following the 
IDEA encouragement for mainstreaming disabled students.  Recently 
in 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized this question in an attempt 
to search for clarity as to the meaning of an appropriate education.64  
In Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas County School District RE-
1, the parents of an autistic student sought funding for a private school 
that specialized in educating children with autism.65  The Court 
evaluated the adequacy of the child’s education, explaining in no 
uncertain terms that to meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA, 
a school “must offer an [individualized education program] reasonably 
calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the 
child’s circumstances.”66  Thus, the IDEA demands more than “de 
minimis” progress from year to year.67  This promising and optimistic 
approach will hopefully cause school systems to consider more than 
the cheapest and easiest way to educate disabled children, which is not 
always in the regular classroom to be lost and forgotten.  
B. Mental Health and Involuntary Civil Commitment  
In O’Connor v. Donaldson, the U.S. Supreme Court expressed 
that the purpose of involuntary hospitalization is the treatment of 
mental illness and not simply custodial care or punishment if the 
mentally ill person is not a danger to himself or others.68  The minimal 
due process protections require that a state “cannot constitutionally 
 
63 Id. at 1001.  See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (2018).  
64 Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017).  See 
Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982) 
(interpreting the IDEA holding that a deaf student was not entitled to a sign language 
interpreter because the child was advancing from grade to grade, and this was evidence that 
she was receiving the most appropriate form of education).  
65 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 991.  
66 Id. at 999.  
67 Id. at 1001. 
68 422 U.S. 563, 570 (1975).  
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confine without more a nondangerous person who is capable of 
surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and 
responsible family members or friends.”69  The Court emphasized that 
the confinement of a nondangerous person based upon a diagnosis of 
a mental disorder alone lacks constitutional sufficiency.70  The need 
for an expansion of out-patient community based mental health 
treatment and services is imperative.71  Coupled with the directive in 
state civil commitment law is the additional mandate that “[t]here is no 
available less restrictive form of intervention consistent with the 
welfare and safety of the individual.”72  
In the landmark decision of Addington v. Texas, the U.S. 
Supreme Court acknowledged that involuntary civil commitment 
“constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty,” resulting in adverse 
social consequences to the mentally ill individual.73  Recognizing the 
significant due process implications of involuntary civil confinement, 
the state must establish proof at the civil commitment hearing by a 
clear and convincing evidence standard of proof.74  
An additional significant bedrock principle of due process 
protection for individuals confronted by involuntary civil commitment 
is to limit the length of confinement in a psychiatric facility.  In 
Jackson v. Indiana, the U.S. Supreme Court specifically prohibited 
indefinite confinement, asserting that the result violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s guarantee of due process.75  In the Court’s analysis, it 
imposed a rule of reasonableness, mandating that without a showing 
 
69 Id. at 576.  
70 Id. at 575.  See Donald H. Stone, Dangerous Minds: Myths and Reality Behind the Violent 
Behavior of the Mentally Ill, Public Perceptions, and the Judicial Response Through 
Involuntary Civil Commitment, 42 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 59, 63 (2018) (citing O’Connor, 422 
U.S. at 575).  
71 Id. at 63-64 (offering recommendations on the danger criterion in civil commitment 
hearings).  
72 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 10-632(e)(2)(v) (West 2018).  
73 441 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1979) (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Humphrey 
v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 
605 (1967)).  
74 Addington, 441 U.S. at 433.  See Donald H. Stone, There Are Cracks in the Civil 
Commitment Process: A Practitioner’s Recommendations to Patch the System, 43 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 789, 818 (2016) (containing recommendations on requiring the burden of proof to 
be the more stringent beyond a reasonable doubt standard).  
75 Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738. 
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of dangerousness, a person involuntarily committed could only be held 
for a reasonable period of time.76  
Several early court decisions have also acknowledged the least 
restrictive alternative principle.  In Lake v. Cameron,77 the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit examined the duty to explore 
alternatives to in-patient hospitalization and noted that “an earnest 
effort should be made to review and exhaust available resources in the 
community in order to provide care reasonably suited to her needs.”78  
In a second case involving the involuntary confinement at Saint 
Elizabeth’s Hospital in Washington D.C., the court in Covington v. 
Harris noted that the principle of the least restrictive alternative 
“inheres in the very nature of civil commitment.”79 
The need for in-patient hospitalization is often seen as a last 
resort, as the court in Welsch v. Likins recognized the “right of least 
restrictive alternatives under the due process clause.”80  The courts 
have recognized the widespread acceptance of a constitutional duty by 
state officials to explore and provide the least stringent practicable 
alternative to confinement of noncriminals.81  The court placed the 
burden on the State to make good faith attempts to place persons with 
mental illness in suitable and appropriate settings to address their 
mental and physical condition while least restrictive on their liberties.82  
These early court decisions lay the framework for the concept of the 
 
76 Id. at 733.  See also Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated, 
414 U.S. 473 (1974) (addressing due process safeguards against unjustified deprivation of 
liberty involving such issues as the timely nature of the petition, nature of jury trial rights, 
length of detention prior to a hearing, right to counsel, hearsay evidence, and privilege against 
self-incrimination).  
77 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).  See Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974) 
(holding that state officials are to consider settings that are least restrictive of patients’ 
liberties).  
78 Lake, 364 F.2d at 660.  See In re S.L., 462 A.2d 1252, 1258 (N.J. 1983) (holding that the 
state shall confine in a setting least restrictive of one’s liberty).  
79 419 F.2d 617, 623 (1969).  The Covington court also recognized that “[t]he principle of 
the least restrictive alternative is equally applicable to alternative dispositions within a mental 
hospital.”  Id. 
80 Welsch, 373 F. Supp. at 501.  See also Hickox v. Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 579 (D.N.J. 
2016).  
81 Welsch, 373 F. Supp. at 502.  
82 Id.  See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 93 (1984) (noting that 
the “large size of [the institution] prevented it from providing the necessary habitation in the 
least restrictive environment”); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 438 
(1985) (discussing the ignorance and prejudice that persons with intellectual disabilities were 
subjected to through a history of unfair and grotesque mistreatment and the attempt to locate 
group homes in community settings).  
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LRE that is now commonplace in civil commitment statutes.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court continued to demonstrate this view by recognizing the 
constitutionally protected interests of non-restrictive confinement in 
Youngberg v Romeo.83 
State civil commitment statutes often highlight the LRE 
concept.  Some describe the principle as the least restrictive alternative, 
as is seen in Alaska in which the term is defined as follows: 
“[L]east restrictive alternative” means mental health 
treatment facilities and conditions of treatment that 
(A) are no more harsh, hazardous, or intrusive than 
necessary to achieve the treatment objectives of the 
patient; and 
(B) involve no restrictions on physical movement nor 
supervised residence or inpatient care except as 
reasonably necessary for the administration of 
treatment or the protection of the patient or others from 
physical injury.84 
In North Dakota, the least restrictive appropriate setting 
requires a “setting that allows an individual with a developmental 
disability to develop and realize the individual’s fullest potential and 
enhances the individual’s ability to cope with the individual’s 
environment.”85  A Pennsylvania regulation emphasizes the 
importance of the “proximity of the treatment facility to the person’s 
natural environment.”86  Wisconsin factors in the limitation on the 
“patient’s freedom of choice and mobility” in the provision of 
treatment and services.87 
What is commonplace in the LRE criteria in civil commitment 
statutes is the requirement that the placement is appropriate and/or 
 
83 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982) (finding that mentally ill persons are “entitled to minimally 
adequate training” in light of the liberty interest “in safety and freedom from unreasonable 
restraints”).  See Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975) (one of the first 
deinstitutionalization cases, placing the duty of locating an alternative facility on both the 
hospital and local government).  
84 ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.915(11) (2018).  See infra Appendix A for comprehensive list of 
state civil commitment statutes highlighting the LRE concept.  
85 N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-01.2-01(6) (2018).  
86 55 PA. CODE § 5100.2 (2018).  
87 WIS. ADMIN. CODE DHS § 94.02(27) (2018). 
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available.88  The presence of the LRE being “available” often becomes 
a burdensome road block to successful release from an inpatient 
psychiatric hospital.  As will be fully articulated in this Article’s 
recommendation section, the burden is too often wrongfully placed on 
the patient rather than the State or in-patient psychiatric facility in 
practice.  
The LRE concept is also standard in various state assisted 
outpatient treatment statutes.89  For instance, New York stipulates that 
the physician must state that the treatment plan is the least restrictive 
alternative.90  California’s assisted outpatient treatment requires that 
“[p]articipation . . . be in the least restrictive placement necessary to 
ensure the person’s recovery and stability.”91  Oklahoma’s alternatives 
to hospitalization similarly require a statement by the petitioner that 
the treatment is the least restrictive alternative.92  As is often seen in 
the involuntary civil commitment statutes for inpatient psychiatric 
hospitalization, the assisted outpatient treatment statutes also contain 
the limitation that the least restrictive alternative is presently available 
and appropriate.93  As with the involuntary commitment statutes, the 
inclusion of the term “available” causes great challenges and dismay 
unless the statute clearly places the burden of persuasion on the State.  
C. Guardianship 
In situations where a legal guardian is sought to provide 
decision making authority surrounding a disabled person’s 
management of his property, medical decisions, and personal matters, 
state guardianship statutes often express the desire to respect the least 
restrictive form of intervention.94  In Wisconsin, for example, the 
 
88 E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-540(b) (2018); 55 PA. CODE § 5100.2; 405 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/3-811(a) (2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 28:55(e)(1) (2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.1708 
(2018).  
89 See infra notes 90-93.  
90 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(i)(3) (McKinney 2018).  See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-
27.15a(a) (West 2018) (“[T]he court shall consider the least restrictive environment for the 
patient to receive clinically appropriate treatment.”).  
91 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5346(a)(7) (West 2018).  See also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-
1B-3(e) (West 2018) (“[T]he person . . . is in need of assisted outpatient treatment as the least 
restrictive appropriate alternative to prevent a relapse or deterioration likely to result in serious 
harm to self or likely to result in serious harm to others.”). 
92 OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A § 5-416(I) (2018).  
93 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.0815(4) (West 2018).  
94 See infra notes 95-97. 
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powers of guardianship of the estate must be guided by a consideration 
of the “least restrictive form of intervention of the ward.”95  
Furthermore, in a 2010 dispute in Tennessee between a daughter and 
her elderly father, the state Court of Appeals utilized the state statute 
mandating an imposition of the least restrictive environment in the 
analysis of the father’s need for a guardian.96  Similarly, the Missouri 
Court of Appeals showed great deference in a close case to the dignity 
and personhood of a disabled person in applying the LRE principle in 
refusing to appoint a legal guardian.97  In short, the LRE finds a 
prominent place when a disabled person faces the loss of autonomy 
and decision making authority.  
D. Community Based Group Homes 
Long before the Olmstead mandate of community based 
treatment, mental health advocates had long fought for the less 
restrictive environment principle for mental health treatment.  The 
ADA and the Fair Housing Act98 added legal might to the LRE, shining 
the spotlight on the importance of requiring persons with disabilities 
to receive public services and accommodations in the most integrated 
setting appropriate to meet their needs, and ensuring the right to fully 
participate in all aspects of society.99 
Several studies have examined the delivery of services to 
people with disabilities.100  A National Council on Disability report in 
2015 examined the research on the impact of the size and types of 
 
95 WIS. STAT. § 54.20(1) (2018).  See also ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.301 (2018) (stating that a 
guardian is appointed “only the authority that is least restrictive upon the liberty of the 
[ward]”).  
96 Todd v. Justice, No. E2009-02346-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 2350568, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. June 14, 2010) (“The court has an affirmative duty to ascertain and impose the least 
restrictive alternatives upon the disabled person.” (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-1-127)).  
97 Nelson v. Nelson, 891 S.W.2d 181 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (refusing to take a strict 
paternalistic approach).  See also D.C. CODE § 21-2045.01(c)(4) (2018) (requiring the 
appointment of a guardian that is the least restrictive guardianship order appropriate for the 
ward).  
98 Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619). 
99 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2018); ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 
122 Stat. 3553 (2008). 
100 Home and Community-Based Services: Creating Systems for Success at Home, at Work 
and in the Community, NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, https://www.ncd.gov/rawmedia_repo 
sitory/HCBS%20Report_FINAL.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2018) (reviewing the impact of the 
Olmstead decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1999).  
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community settings on outcomes for people with disabilities.101  The 
results supported the proposition that “smaller, more dispersed and 
individualized community settings further integration and positive 
outcomes for individuals with disabilities.”102  This report also 
provided important recommendations to states regarding community 
settings, including: 
(1) limiting residence setting size;103 
(2) quality management;104  
(3) financial alignment across current funding, resource 
and rate setting, setting of system goals, and the current 
HCBS regulations;105  
(4) assuring stakeholder engagement throughout the 
planning and implementation of plans, processes, and 
programs;106  
(5) oversight that enhances provider expectations about 
qualifications, training, and giving necessary services 
and supports;107 and  
(6) expansion of opportunities that promote self-
determination and consumer control in living 
alternatives across the broad array of people with 
disabilities receiving federal benefits.108 
The report highlighted the LRE principle through the use of the 
Medicaid waiver program in 1981, which laid the foundation for 
“people with even the most intensive service needs [to] effectively be 
supported in small, non-restrictive integrated community settings.”109  
The report also focused on the benefits of integrating persons with 
 
101 Id. at 22-30.  
102 Id. at 7.  
103 Id. at 9.  The report also notes that a majority of U.S. studies reported that programs 
utilizing smaller residence sizes showed better outcomes.  Id. at 28.  
104 Id. at 9.  The report recommends data collection to track systems performance.  Id. at 60.  
105 Id. at 9.  The report encourages provider reimbursement practices that “support service 
delivery in the most integrated setting.”  Id. at 60.  
106 Id. at 9.  The report suggests establishing relationships with families and disability 
advocates to advise on policy issues.  Id. at 61.  
107 Id. at 9.  Staff should receive “adequate training to provide effective services.”  Id. at 61.  
108 Id. at 9.  The report encourages “self-directed, consumer controlled living alternatives.”  
Id. at 61.  
109 Id. at 12.  The Omnibus Budget & Reconciliation Act of 1981 is the primary mechanism 
for community based services.  Id. at 14.  
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disabilities into society and the resulting better quality of life outcomes 
across such areas as community participation and housing stability.110  
There are studies that demonstrate that although community 
residential homes for persons with disabilities have “no negative 
impact on the surrounding neighborhood[,] . . . the accommodation of 
these group homes in residential districts remains a controversial 
issue.”111  An important recommendation to local governments to 
ensure that local zoning ordinances do not raise barriers for inclusion 
of group homes for the disabled and aging populations is to classify 
such homes for residential uses, as opposed to commercial 
properties.112  In addition, the Department of Health and Human 
Services Office for Civil Rights (hereinafter “OCR”), the office 
responsible for investigating complaints alleging a violation of the 
ADA’s integration regulation, must continue its efforts to move 
persons with disabilities from institutional facilities to the 
community.113  Such an investigation process will ensure compliance 
with the Olmstead decree, as well as with the ADA mandate promoting 
the LRE.114  
A common trend in this arena is the unfortunate concept known 
as “not in my backyard” (hereinafter “NIMBY”), whereby local 
residents strongly oppose the location of alcohol and drug treatment 
facilities in their community.115  This outcry is often extended to 
community resistance to locating mental health services and housing 
 
110 Id. at 17-18.  See Florence D. DiGennaro Reed et al., Barriers to Independent Living for 
Individuals with Disabilities and Seniors, 7 ASS’N FOR BEHAV. ANALYSIS INT’L 70, 70 (2014), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4711747/pdf/40617_2014_Article_11.pdf 
(“[A]dults usually enjoy greater choice when they live in their own homes relative to 
individuals living in congregate care or group home settings.”).  Barriers to independent living 
include personal safety, household skills, and medication assistance.  Id. at 74.  
111 Michele B. McGlyn & Donald L. Elliott, Group Home Regulations under State and 
Federal Law, 35 COLO. LAW. 37, 38 (2006).  
112 Id. at 38.  
113 Delivering on the Promise: OCR’s Compliance Activities Promote Community 
Integration, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES (Sept. 2006), https://www.hhs.gov/civil-
rights/for-individuals/special-topics/community-living-and-olmstead/compliance-activities-
promote-integration/index.html.  
114 Id.  See Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 598 F. Supp. 2d 289 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(involving an organization alleging violations of the ADA integration mandate on behalf of 
mentally ill persons living in state-licensed adult homes).  
115 Amanda Habermann, Not In My Backyard: Communities Resist Mental Health, and 
Alcohol and Drug Treatment Facilities, SOVEREIGN HEALTH, https://www.sovhealth.com/edit 
orials/not-in-my-backyard/not-backyard-communities-resist-mental-health-alcohol-drug-
treatment-facilities/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2018). 
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in the local residents’ community.116  Based largely on unfounded fears 
and negative stereotypes, NIMBY promotes discrimination and 
stigmatization of people with physical or mental illnesses.117  
There are important sociological reasons for integrating group 
homes for persons with physical or mental disabilities within 
residential settings in the community.  Such benefits include 
community integration, educating the community about stigmatized 
populations, and even the deterrence of crime near group homes 
because residents are specifically required to maintain positive 
behavior and are vigilant of this fact.118  
An interesting and compelling 2016 study explored this issue 
of whether drug treatment centers actually bring more crime to a 
neighborhood, and revealed that the public anxiety about such facilities 
is not borne out by the data.119  The study showed that violent crime is 
more likely to be present near a liquor store or corner store than a drug 
treatment center.120  By comparing crimes that arose at fifty-three 
methadone treatment programs with crimes near liquor stores and 
convenience stores, the study proved that “[t]here [were] significantly 
more rapes, homicides, assaults, and robberies near the stores” as 
compared to the methadone clinics.121 
 
116 Id. 
117 Id. (“While many residents fear that alcohol and drug treatment facilities will increase 
crime rates due to the established link between substance abuse and crime, there is no evidence 
that suggests that people with [substance use disorders] who receive adequate treatment are 
any more likely to commit crimes than other people in the general population.”). 
118 Leonard A. Jason et al., Counteracting ‘Not in My Backyard’: The Positive Effects of 
Greater Occupancy within Mutual-help Recovery Homes, 36 J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 947 
(2008).  
119 Dale Keiger, Do Drug Treatment Centers Bring More Crime to a Neighborhood?, JOHN 
HOPKINS MAG., Spring 2016, https://hub.jhu.edu/magazine/2016/spring/nimby-drug-
treament-centers/ (citing C. Debra M. Furr-Holden et al., Not in My Back Yard: A Comparative 
Analysis of Crime Around Publicly Funded Drug Treatment Centers, Liquor Stores, 
Convenience Stores, and Corner Stores in One Mid-Atlantic City, 77 J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL & 
DRUGS 17 (2016) (recognizing that “[d]rug treatment centers are a public health need” and as 
“necessary as urgent care centers and emergency department” (alteration in original))).  
120 Id.  See also Jeff Deeney, “A Methadone Clinic? Not in My Neighborhood!”, 
SUBSTANCE.COM (Jan. 16, 2015), https://www.substance.com/a-methadone-clinic-not-in-my-
neighborhood/.  
121 Methadone Treatment Programs—NIMBY or Not?, MEDMARK TREATMENT CENTERS 
(Feb. 5, 2016), https://medmark.com/methadone-treatment-programs-nimby-or-not/ (citing 
Furr-Holden et al., supra note 119).  See also Brandon Duncan, “Not in My Backyard” Views 
Hinder Efforts to Curb Addiction Epidemic, STEPWORKS RECOVERY CTR. (Nov. 30, 2016), 
http://www.stepworks.com/2016/11/30/nimby-opposition-to-addiction-treatment-facilities-
ups-risks/ (discussing local county ordinances that place strict limits on locating addiction 
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Disability Rights California issued another important report 
addressing NIMBY in 2014.122  The recommendations include 
encouraging state and local government to “support efforts to reduce 
stigma against people with mental health disabilities” and to “promote 
funding for affordable housing and supportive services.”123  In 
addition, the report recommends encouraging the state to promote 
supportive housing to individuals with mental health disabilities at risk 
of institutionalization and to encourage local authorities to utilize 
zoning ordinances to discourage “NIMBYism.”124 
The importance of enabling individuals with disabilities to 
interact with non-disabled persons to the fullest extent possible is a 
foundational principle of the LRE concept.  Such integrated settings 
offer individuals with disabilities opportunities to reside, work and 
obtain supportive services in the community as individuals without 
disabilities do.125  Scattered-site housing with supportive services, as 
opposed to congregate settings populated exclusively or primarily with 
persons with disabilities, provides a more integrated setting.126  
The U.S. Department of Justice (hereinafter “DOJ”) Civil 
Rights Division is tasked with enforcement of the integration mandate 
of the ADA and compliance with the Olmstead mandate.127  In 
addition, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(hereinafter “HUD”) plays an important role in increasing efforts to 
move individuals out of institutions and into integrated community 
settings.128  HUD directives require states to take the lead in offering a 
range of housing options in a community setting with “substantial 
opportunities for individuals with disabilities to live and interact with 
 
treatment facilities, negatively resulting in their location away from residential areas to 
shopping centers).  
122 DISABILITY RIGHTS CAL., EVERYONE’S NEIGHBORHOOD: ADDRESSING “NOT IN MY 
BACKYARD” OPPOSITION TO SUPPORTIVE HOUSING FOR PEOPLE WITH MENTAL HEALTH 
DISABILITIES (2014), https://www.disabilityrightsca.org/system/files/file-attachments/CM530 
1.pdf.  
123 Id. at 7.  
124 Id.  
125 U.S. DEP’T JUST.: C.R. DIVISION, STATEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ON 
ENFORCEMENT OF INTEGRATION MANDATE OF TITLE II OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 
ACT AND OLMSTEAD V. L.C. (2011), https://www.ada.gov/olmstead/q&a_olmstead.htm 
[hereinafter DOJ and Olmstead].  
126 Id.  
127 Id.  
128 U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT, STATEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT ON THE ROLE OF HOUSING IN ACCOMPLISHING THE GOALS 
OF OLMSTEAD 1 (2013), https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/olmsteadguidnc060413.pdf.  
20
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individuals without disabilities.”129  Also within HUD’s wheelhouse, 
the Fair Housing Act (hereinafter “FHA”) is clearly intended to 
promote such integration in the housing arena in order to accomplish 
the goals of Olmstead.130  It is clear that integrated settings are best 
found in “mainstream society,” which includes access to community 
activities and opportunities, affords the individual a choice in daily 
activities, and offers opportunities for interaction between disabled and 
non-disabled individuals “to the fullest extent possible.”131  These 
principles highlight the nature and substance of the LRE concept.  
Overwhelming evidence has demonstrated that permitting 
individuals with disabilities to reside in a family-like setting in the 
community is not only less expensive than institutionalization, but is 
also substantially more effective and teaches important life skills.132  
E. Architectural Accessibility  
The LRE is also prevalent in the architectural design and 
construction of public places.133  The ADA prohibits discrimination on 
the “basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of goods, 
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any 
place of public accommodation.”134  The ADA mandate of inclusion 
prohibits a public accommodation from offering disabled persons 
“opportunit[ies] to participate in or benefit from” the goods and 
services that are not “equal to [those] afforded to other individuals.”135  
The inclusion obligation prohibits a “different or separate” benefit to 
persons with disabilities “unless such action is necessary.”136  The 
ADA promotes public accommodations affording goods and services 
 
129 Id. at 4.  
130 Id. at 9.  
131 DOJ and Olmstead, supra note 125.  
132 APA Policy Guide on Community Residences, AM. PLAN. ASS’N (Sept. 22, 1997), 
https://www.planning.org/policy/guides/adopted/commres.htm (highlighting the importance 
of locating community residences in the “same residential zoning districts as dwellings 
occupied by biological families”).  
133 See infra notes 134-41.  
134 28 C.F.R. § 36.201(a) (2018).  A place of public accommodation means “a facility 
operated by a private entity whose operations affect commerce and fall within” one of twelve 
categories including places of lodging, restaurants, movie theaters, museums, and places of 
recreation.  Id. § 36.104.  
135 Id. § 36.202(b). 
136 Id. § 36.202(c). 
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to individuals with disabilities “in the most integrated setting 
appropriate to the needs of the individual.”137 
There have been challenges in the context of public 
accommodations, specifically to relegating disabled persons to the 
back of the theater, as was seen in Fiedler v. American Multi-Cinema, 
Inc.138  The allegation in Fiedler was that the movie theater deprived 
the disabled wheelchair user of the full and equal enjoyment of the 
facility, and the plaintiff sought seating dispersed throughout the 
theater.139  The court denied summary judgment on the basis that 
determining whether dispersed wheelchair seating would pose a 
danger to other patrons in the case of an emergency demanded a fact-
specific assessment.140  Nonetheless, the court’s analysis recognized 
the importance of architectural accessibility for disabled individuals in 
public accommodations.141  
One possible solution to these recurring issues is the increase 
in use of universal design.  In contrast to “accessible design,” whereby 
the needs of disabled individuals are specifically considered, and 
“usable design,” whereby specialized products are created for efficient 
use, universal design incorporates “products and environments to be 
usable by all people . . . without the need for adaption or specialized 
design.”142  Utilizing universal design is the purest form of inclusion 
because it serves to benefit all people, and not just those who are 
“average” or “typical.”143  The use of universal design in addressing 
persons with “mobility, agility, and perceptual acuity” is an important 
 
137 Id. § 36.203(a).  
138 871 F. Supp. 35, 36 (D.D.C. 1994) (discussing plaintiff’s claim that the placement of 
wheelchair seating in the rear of the theater “relegat[ed] him to inferior seating”).  
139 Id.  The court ultimately denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, holding 
that, although seats should be dispersed under the ADA, an “individualized assessment” of the 
facts was necessary to ensure safety of all patrons in the case of an emergency.  Id. at 39.  See 
United States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 380 F.3d 558 (1st Cir. 2004) (challenging “lines of 
sight” in stadium theater seating for wheelchair-bound individuals).  
140 Fiedler, 871 F. Supp. at 40.   
141 Id. at 37-40.  
142 What is the Difference Between Accessible, Usable and Universal Design?, 
DISABILITIES, OPPORTUNITIES, INTERNETWORKING, & TECH., https://www.washington.edu/doi 
t/what-difference-between-accessible-usable-and-universal-design (last updated Sept. 15, 
2017).  Examples of universal design include automatically opening doors at grocery stores or 
sidewalks with “curb cuts.”  Id.  
143 Id.  
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design principle for architects, and should be more frequently 
considered.144 
Planning and designing for persons with disabilities is crucial 
to making inclusion a reality.  The promise of inclusion within places 
of public accommodations will by necessity require creative and 
thoughtful architects and planners to address the needs presented by 
persons with disabilities seeking acceptance and full participation in 
all society has to offer.  
F. Termination of Parental Rights 
The least restrictive alternative principle is also commonly seen 
in family law in termination of parental rights (hereinafter “TPR”) 
proceedings.145  In situations when a parent neglects, abuses, or 
abandons a child and the State’s protective services apparatus 
intervenes, courts are guided by the LRE principle to ensure that TPR 
is a last resort.146  For instance, in C.V.T. v. Department of Children 
and Family Services, the court reversed the termination of the mother’s 
parental rights due to the failure of the Department of Children and 
Family Services to establish that termination was the least restrictive 
means of preventing harm to the child in question.147  Similarly, in a 
second case involving TPR, a Florida court in In re Z.C. highlighted 
the least restrictive means test.148  The court recognized the importance 
of the least restrictive mandate in finding that the Department of 
Children and Family Services must prove that termination is the least 
restrictive way to protect the child.149  It is evident that the 
determination of what is in the best interest of the child is guided by 
the least restrictive alternative decision in far reaching areas of the law 
and public policy initiatives.  
 
144 Allen C. Abend, Planning and Designing for Students with Disabilities, NAT’L 
CLEARINGHOUSE FOR EDUC. FACILITIES 2 (2001), http://www.ncef.org/pubs/disabilities.pdf.  
145 See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.  
146 See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text. 
147 843 So. 2d 366, 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (“If the Mother were able to continue 
making progress towards recovery, termination would not be the least restrictive means of 
preventing harm to the child.”). See In re R.J.M., 266 S.E.2d 114, 114 (W. Va. 1980) 
(discussing the least restrictive alternative regarding TPR and how “courts are not required to 
exhaust every speculative possibility of parental improvement”).  
148 88 So. 3d 977, 987 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (noting that the trial court misapplied the 
least restrictive means test by basing its decision to be terminated solely on the availability of 
the alternative placement).  
149 Id. at 988.  
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V. WHERE WE GO FROM HERE?: A NEW FOCUS OF SPECIAL 
EDUCATION 
During nearly forty years since the passage of the Education 
for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, children with disabilities 
have been integrated or mainstreamed in large numbers and in various 
ways.150  However, this shift has also brought various challenges and 
unanswered questions.  Should the presumption of providing 
appropriate special education for children with disabilities in the 
regular classroom continue to be the first option of choice?  Why not 
start with the middle option within the range of alternatives, the 
suitable choice of placement in the mainstream, regular classroom part 
of the day and placement in a special education class the other part of 
the day?  Placement decisions should begin here first, and movement 
to a less restrictive setting or a more restrictive setting would be 
contingent on the individualized education program (hereinafter 
“IEP”) meeting resulting in the appropriate placement setting.  
The IDEA sets forth a requirement that school divisions ensure 
a continuum of alternative placement options to meet the unique needs 
of children with disabilities.151  This cascade model of special 
education services ranges “from the least restrictive placement in the 
regular education classroom to the most restrictive placement in a 
hospital or institutional setting.”152  The cascade model “facilitates 
tailoring of treatment” of the degree of placement specialization and 
the maximum number of children in the various placement options.153  
The model envisions placement in the regular educational classroom 
as the “primary and optimal setting,” and a child would be moved to a 
more restrictive setting only for “compelling educational reasons and . 
. . moved back as quickly as possible.”154  First established by Evelyn 
Deno in 1970, this system provides seven levels, ranging from 
 
150 See supra Section IV.A.  
151 34 C.F.R. § 300.115(a) (2018).  For example, in Maryland, the continuum of alternative 
placements must be available to the extent necessary to implement the IEP.  Md. Code Regs. 
13A.05.01.10(B) (2018).  
152 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SPECIAL EDUCATION: A REFERENCE FOR THE EDUCATION OF 
CHILDREN, ADOLESCENTS, AND ADULTS WITH DISABILITIES AND OTHER EXCEPTIONAL 
INDIVIDUALS 362-63 (Cecil R. Reynolds & Elaine Fletcher-Janzen eds., 3d ed. 2007).  
153 Id. at 362 (quoting Evelyn Deno, Special Education as Developmental Capital, 37 
EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 229, 235 (1970)).  
154 Id.  
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education in the regular classroom to hospital or in-patient residential 
settings as follows: 
Level 1: Children in regular classes . . . with or without 
medical or counseling supportive therapies. 
Level 2: Regular class attendance plus supplementary 
instructional services 
Level 3: Part-time special class 
Level 4: Full-time special class 
Level 5: Special stations 
Level 6: Homebound  
Level 7: Instruction in hospital or domiciled setting [in-
patient programs]155 
The IDEA starting point is level one, in that it requires that 
“appropriate special education and related services, and aids and 
supports,” whenever appropriate, are provided for in the regular 
classroom.156  Rather than starting placement discussions at level one 
and moving to other options when necessary to provide appropriate 
education, the discussion between parents and school officials should 
instead begin at level 3, the setting whereby a disabled student spends 
the primary part of the day in the regular classroom and is taught for 
three hours or less per day in the special education class.157  
The special education class would be dramatically reduced in 
class size with teachers specifically trained in special education.158  
This bold proposal, starting at level 3 rather than the current default of 
level 1, would result in more varied educational settings offered for all 
students with disabilities.  While it is true that education in the regular 
classroom may offer social benefits to the disabled child,159 and surely 
it is less costly to the school district than level 3 or 4,160 tossing disabled 
 
155 Deno, supra note 153 (“The most specialized facilities are likely to be needed by the 
fewest children on a long term basis.”). 
156 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5)(D) (2018).  
157 Deno, supra note 153.  
158 REBECCA A. HINES, INCLUSION IN MIDDLE SCHOOLS 4-5 (2001), https://files.eric.ed.gov/f 
ulltext/ED459000.pdf. 
159 CAROL A. KOCHHAR ET AL., SUCCESSFUL INCLUSION: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR A 
SHARED RESPONSIBILITY (2d ed. 1999). 
160 Lori Garrett-Hatfield, The Cost of Mainstreaming Vs. Special Education Classes, 
CAREER TREND,  https://careertrend.com/the-cost-of-mainstreaming-vs-special-education-clas 
ses-12067245.html (last updated July 21, 2017).  Educating a student with disabilities costs 
on average almost twice as much as educating a typical non-disabled student.  Jay G. 
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children into a regular classroom environment as a default without 
consideration for their individualized circumstances may in fact be 
doing them a disservice.  
In order to ensure that the inclusion mandate is respected, 
flexibility should be paramount in the placement discussion.  This 
discussion may very well lead to the ultimate placement result at level 
1; however, starting at the middle of the scale, rather than the extreme 
end, will lead to a more detailed and fuller discussion of creative 
options.  Placing children with disabilities routinely in the regular 
classroom as the presumptive choice, without significant thought and 
discussion of alternatives, may prove to be an unwise and short-sighted 
model.  
There are voices of discontent rising up in various communities 
against the notion of default inclusion.  For instance, members of the 
special education teaching community have voiced opposition.161  As 
is seen in “Special Education: The Myth of the Least Restrictive 
Environment,” Dr. Steven Simpson opines that classrooms filled with 
thirty kids, four or five who are special education students, is 
frustrating for the teacher.162  Trying to serve special education 
students in the regular classroom in an overcrowded setting with 
teachers who may be untrained in special education is a recipe for 
failure.163  For school divisions to be laser-focused on placement in the 
regular classroom for disabled students as the first choice option may 
result in roadblocks for other more appropriate and unique initiatives 
to be seriously considered.  
The deaf/hard-of-hearing (hereinafter “DHH”) community is 
particularly vocal in their opposition to mainstreaming as the default 
setting.164  Their needs are unique in that the typical school curriculum 
 
Chambers et al., What Are We Spending on Special Education Services in the United States, 
1999-2000?, AM. INSTITUTES FOR RES. (June 2004), https://www.air.org/sites/default/files/SE 
EP1-What-Are-We-Spending-On.pdf. 
161 See infra notes 162-63.  
162 Steven W. Simpson, Special Education: The Myth of the Least Restrictive Environment 
(Nov. 1, 2005), BRIDGES4KIDS, https://www.bridges4kids.org/articles/2005/11-05/Simpson11 
-1-05.html (discussing how reducing the class size to 15 rather than 30 is a monetary problem).  
163 Id.  See Kristie Lauren Trifiolis, LRE Under the IDEA: Has Mainstreaming Gone Too 
Far?, SETON HALL L. SCH. STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP (May 1, 2014), http://scholarship.shu.edu/ 
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1594&context=student_scholarship (noting that not all disabled 
students can benefit from mainstreaming, class sizes are too large, teachers are poorly 
prepared, and non-disabled students may be neglected).  
164 Kevin T. Williams, Least Restrictive Environment (LRE) and Deaf Students, NAT’L 
TECHNICAL INST. FOR THE DEAF (Apr. 1, 2016), http://www.raisingandeducatingdeafchildren. 
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is grounded and designed in spoken language skills.165  For this reason, 
the regular classroom is “arguably restrictive in that it is not designed 
for DHH children.”166  In response to a 1988 report that recommended 
various changes to how the federal education system supports deaf 
students, the Department of Education issued policy guidelines in 1992 
that highlighted the difficulties faced by deaf students in obtaining a 
FAPE.167  In these guidelines, the Department stressed that additional 
factors may need to be considered in developing an IEP for these 
students.168  The deaf community is also unique among many other 
disabled individuals in that deafness is often not viewed as a disability 
at all, but instead as a cultural experience with a common language 
(e.g., ASL), community, and values.169  Placing DHH children who 
identify this way in the regular classroom is akin to placing a non-
English speaker in an English speaking class and expecting him to 
achieve at the same level as native speakers.170  
Some critics of the LRE in the special education setting also 
point to concerns of race and class inequalities.  It is clear that lower 
resource schools invest less in special education staffing and certain 
special education services as compared to higher resource schools.171  
When only limited services are available, “an availability inquiry may 
find that the student needs a more restrictive placement simply because 
the lower-achieving school has not made needed services available.”172  
 
org/2016/04/01/least-restrictive-environment-lre-and-deaf-students/.  See Lamar Alexander, 
Deaf Students Education Services, U.S. DEP’T EDUC.: OFF. FOR C.R., Oct. 26, 1992, 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/hq9806.html (expressing concern that deaf 
students have significant obstacles to overcome in order to have access to FAPE, particularly 
with regard to communication needs).  
165 Williams, supra note 164.  
166 Id.  
167 Alexander, supra note 164.  Leeanne Seaver, Deaf is Different: Educational Impacts 
and Cultural Perspectives, HANDS & VOICES, http://www.handsandvoices.org/articles/educati 
on/law/different.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2018).  
168 Alexander, supra note 164 (factors include “1. Communication needs and the child’s 
and family’s preferred mode of communication; 2. Linguistic needs; 3. Severity of hearing 
loss and potential for using residual hearing; 4. Academic level; and 5. Social, emotional, and 
cultural needs including opportunities for peer interactions and communication”). 
169 Seaver, supra note 167.  
170 Id.  
171 Cari Carson, Rethinking Special Education’s “Least Restrictive Environment” 
Requirement, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1397, 1408-09 (2015) (citing JAY G. CHAMBERS ET AL., CTR. 
FOR SPECIAL EDUC. FIN., DISTRICT REVENUES AND STUDENT POVERTY: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
SPECIAL EDUCATION RESOURCES AND SERVICES 3-4 (1995), http://csef.air.org/publications/cse 
f/briefs/brief5.pdf).  
172 Id. at 1409.  
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This may then lead to low-income students being pigeonholed into 
inappropriate placements and lost within the system for the duration of 
their education.173  To make matters worse, children in these low-
income school districts are also disproportionately students of color.174  
Parents of disabled children are also not entirely in support of 
the mainstream concept.  Frequently, “parents run in the opposite 
direction” of the LRE, “seeking education in specialized programs.”175  
“Integration for integration’s sake,” once seen as a valid concern to 
combat rampant discrimination, is “no longer perceived as a pressing 
one.”176  
Furthermore, integration is often illusory, with “only token 
interaction at a distance” between general students and disabled 
students.177  Education advocates are recognizing that the LRE 
mandate must be considered in the context of the Endrew F. directive 
that “school[s] must offer [education that is] reasonably calculated to 
enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s 
circumstances.”178  The more demanding standard of educational 
progress is greater than the “merely more than de minimis” test of the 
past.179  There are no longer the grave concerns of disabled students 
being excluded completely from educational programs, as was seen in 
the early days of the passage of the IDEA.180  Today, students with 
disabilities are demanding and expecting an educational program that 
will give them every opportunity to fulfill their potential.  
Despite these objections, the benefits of mainstreaming should 
not be ignored when it is indeed appropriate and productive for the 
disabled student to be placed in the regular classroom.  Many 
educational specialists highlight the benefits of mainstreaming for the 
disabled student, the students without disabilities, and the teacher.181  
For example, the National Longitudinal Transition Study reviewed the 
 
173 Id.  
174 Id. at 1408 (citing CHILDREN’S DEF. FUND, THE STATE OF AMERICA’S CHILDREN 34-35 
(2014), http://www.childrensdefense.org/library/state-of-americas-children/2014-soac.pdf).  
175 Bonnie Spiro Schinagle & Marilyn J. Bartlett, The Strained Dynamic of the Least 
Restrictive Environment Concept in the IDEA, 35 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 229, 230 (2015).  
176 Id. at 249. 
177 Id. at 247; Ruth Colker, The Disability Integration Presumption: Thirty Years Later, 154 
U. PA. L. REV. 789, 799-800 (2006). 
178 Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 999 (2017).  
179 Id. at 1000. 
180 Id. at 999.  
181 See infra note 182.  
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educational outcomes of 11,000 students with disabilities and found 
that “more time spent in a general education classroom was positively 
correlated with: a) fewer absences from school, b) fewer referrals for 
disruptive behavior, and c) better outcomes after high school in the 
areas of employment and independent living.”182  Moreover, students 
without disabilities made greater gains in math and reading when 
taught in inclusive settings.183  
Research has indicated that students with disabilities benefit 
from inclusion, resulting in more appropriate social behavior, higher 
levels of achievement, and improved ability of students and teachers 
to adapt to different teaching and learning styles.184  However, 
researchers have also found that removing the barriers to inclusion 
requires smaller class sizes and additional, properly trained teachers.185  
One challenge is that many teachers are not sufficiently prepared to 
work in an inclusive setting.186  The necessary collaboration among 
teachers requires “a shift in control and sharing of a learning 
environment rather than having individual space, both concepts 
foreign to the traditionally trained teacher.”187  Nonetheless, there has 
been criticism of the inclusion model, ranging from “low self-esteem 
of students with disabilities” to “poor academic grades.”188  
The importance of significantly smaller class sizes and 
enhanced teacher training is pivotal in order for the inclusion model to 
be beneficial to students with disabilities.  The fear of the disabled 
student being lost in the shuffle and not receiving appropriate 
educational benefits continues to be a concern for parents and 
educators.189  The need for greater funding expenditures for 
educational programs is also a necessity.  Significant research 
 
182 Xuan Bui et al., Inclusive Education Research & Practice, MD. COALITION FOR 
INCLUSIVE EDUC. 2 (2010), http://docplayer.net/15573125-Inclusive-education-research-
practice.html (citing MARY WAGNER ET AL., THE ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT AND FUNCTIONAL 
PERFORMANCE OF YOUTH WITH DISABILITIES: A REPORT FROM THE NATIONAL LONGITUDINAL 
TRANSITION STUDY-2 (NLTS2), NAT’L CTR. FOR SPECIAL EDUC. RES. ix-xii (2006), 
https://ies.ed.gov/ncser/pdf/20063000.pdf.).  
183 Id. at 3.  
184 KOCHHAR ET AL., supra note 159. 
185 HINES, supra note 158. 
186 Id. at 5.  
187 Id. (“[A]ccepting new ideas about teaching, learning, and learning styles is called for 
and not always embraced by teachers.”).  
188 Id.  Another criticism is the lack of training for teachers in the general education setting.  
Id.  
189 Schinagle & Bartlett, supra note 175, at 230.  
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demonstrates that disabled students require the opportunity to 
“[d]evelop positive social-emotional skills,” “[a]cquire and use 
knowledge and skills,” and “[u]se appropriate behaviors to meet their 
own needs.”190  Inclusion settings offer greater opportunities for social 
and emotional development.191  Although research shows that included 
children demonstrate academic gains, one would still wonder whether 
a mix of educational settings with part of the day spent in a specialized 
class with significantly fewer students (less than 26) and teachers with 
specialized training (hereinafter “mixed classroom setting”) could 
offer even better academic outcomes for disabled students.192 
The mixed classroom setting might offer even greater academic 
success without sacrificing the social and emotional benefits an 
inclusive setting can provide.  This educational alternative should be 
more frequently considered before disabled students are placed all day, 
every day, in a mainstream setting that may not be best for them.  
Recognizing this alternative may be an unpopular proposition, but the 
discussion of educational placement options should start with the 
mixed classroom setting, and then move along the continuum as 
appropriate.  The placement alternative along the cascade system 
should permit easy movement to a less restrictive or more restrictive 
setting, depending on the unique needs of the disabled child.  
One must not lose sight of the fundamental principle of the 
IDEA, which creates a presumption in favor of integrating children 
with disabilities, to the maximum extent appropriate, into the regular 
classroom.193  Although the mainstreaming goal is laudable, it cannot 
be achieved uniformly, and may in certain circumstances actually 
violate the IDEA itself.194  The emphasis must be on the necessity that 
the educational program appropriately meets the child’s needs.  
 
190 WILLIAM R. HENNINGER, IV & SARIKA S. GUPTA, FIRST STEPS TO PRESCHOOL INCLUSION: 
HOW TO JUMPSTART YOUR PROGRAMWIDE PLAN 37 (2014), http://archive.brookespublishing.c 
om/documents/gupta-how-children-benefit-from-inclusion.pdf.  
191 Id. at 40.  
192 Id. at 40-41.  
193 A.G. ex rel. S.G. v. Wissahickon Sch. Dist., 374 F. App’x 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2010).  
194 See Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg ex rel. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884, 897 
(9th Cir. 1995) (holding that “where separate teaching would produce superior results” to 
mainstreaming, mainstreaming is neither appropriate nor satisfactory).   
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VI. THE LRE PRINCIPLE IN INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT 
When a person with a mental illness is allegedly a danger to 
themselves or others, an in-patient psychiatric facility is often the 
placement of choice unless there is a less restrictive setting that is 
appropriate.195  An additional burden facing a person with a mental 
illness is that judges often find that the less restrictive setting must be 
readily available.196  The question of who has the burden to prove that 
the LRE is not available and how much proof is actually necessary to 
meet this burden is less than clear in practice.  
What is sufficient evidence to show that the LRE setting 
outside an in-patient psychiatric hospital is unavailable?  Does the 
hospital, state, or local jurisdiction have the burden to present clear and 
convincing evidence that no LRE is available?  What if the primary 
reason for no LRE being available is due to lack of funding?  What if 
it is less expensive to offer a community based treatment plan?  Should 
that be satisfactory to the judge in determining placement options?  Is 
it a lost cause to advocate for an LRE if such an option is not currently 
available because the state’s mental health apparatus has chosen not to 
create such a community based model?  Are we approaching the 
question in an individual case-by-case way when what is necessary is 
a systemic overhaul of funding for mental health treatment?  
All too often, mental health policymakers and decisionmakers 
determine the placement of individuals with mental illness on the basis 
of what is currently available in the local community rather than on the 
basis of what would appropriately meet their needs.197  The pressing 
demand for community based alternatives, including treatment and 
housing, must be appropriately funded to make the appropriate LRE 
available more frequently in a community setting rather than a hospital 
setting.  State governments must take the lead in funding these much 
needed community based options and local housing alternatives.  Only 
then will the LRE become more than an empty promise for persons 
with mental illness. 
 
195 See infra Appendix A.  
196 See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
197 See infra Appendix A.  See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202B.040(3) (West 2018).  
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A. Treatment of Substance Abuse  
The continuum of alternative settings is also a guiding principle 
in the treatment of substance abuse and addiction.198  The stated “goal 
is to place patients in the least restrictive environment that is still safe 
and effective and then move them along a continuum of care as they 
demonstrate capacity and motivation to cooperate with treatment.”199  
The continuum of treatment settings range from the most intensive to 
least, including “inpatient hospitalization, residential treatment, 
intensive outpatient treatment, and outpatient treatment.”200  The least 
restrictive care ensures patients’ civil rights and their right to choice of 
care.201  The treatment setting should provide for the freedom to 
participate in society, and should permit disagreement with clinician 
recommendations for care.  A one size fits all approach should never 
be the treatment option of choice, as an individual inquiry should be 
the preferred method.  
B. Funding Challenges  
In an ideal world, funding particular programs for persons with 
disabilities would not be a factor in determining the appropriate 
setting.  A person with a mental illness would receive community 
mental health services and suitable housing regardless of the cost.  
One, of course, quickly recognizes that funding particular programs is 
a complicated maze of public and private endeavors.  Federal, state, 
and local funding for social service programs is often intertwined, and 
generally such public entities are focused on all residents of the 
community, including the disabled and the non-disabled, the indigent, 
the homeless, and other underserved populations in the community.202  
When funding for such programs is in short supply, as it often is, local 
and state agencies are forced to make tough choices regarding cuts and 
allocation of limited resources.203 
 
198 ELEANOR SULLIVAN & MICHAEL FLEMING, A GUIDE TO SUBSTANCE ABUSE SERVICES FOR 
PRIMARY CARE CLINICIANS 78 (1997), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK64827/pdf/B 
ookshelf_NBK64827.pdf. 
199 Id. at 60.  
200 Id. at 78.  
201 Id. at 51.  
202 See Concerned Parents to Save Dreher Park Ctr. v. City of W. Palm Beach, 846 F. Supp. 
986, 993 (S.D. Fla. 1994).  
203 See infra notes 204-09 and accompanying text. 
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For instance, in West Palm Beach, Florida in 1986, the city 
made “a variety of recreational and social programs available to 
individuals with disabilities and their families.”204  In 1993, as a result 
of budget cuts, the City made a choice to effectively eliminate these 
programs.205  In the resulting litigation, the court held that the budget 
cuts resulted in the complete elimination of the programs designed for 
persons with disabilities.206  Rather than reduce the cost of all 
recreational programming across the board, the City opted to eliminate 
solely those programs for the disabled.207  The court in Dreher Park 
noted that “[a]lthough the ADA contemplates that public entities will 
provide ‘integrated settings’ for services and programs, the 
requirement is for ‘the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs 
of the individuals with disabilities.’”208  Although the recreation 
programs that continued to receive funding were open to non-disabled 
and the disabled, the specific nature of the recreation program 
previously offered was specially designed to meet the unique needs of 
persons with disabilities.209  
The ADA permits different or separate programs to be 
“provided if they are ‘necessary to provide qualified individuals with 
disabilities with aids, benefits, or services that are as effective as those 
provided to others.’”210  The court held that the Dreher Park Center 
programs for disabled persons were “needed to give equal benefits of 
recreation to persons with disabilities,” and when such programs were 
eliminated, disabled persons were denied the benefit of the City’s 
leisure services in violation of Title II of the ADA.211  The resounding 
message from the court was that when the City chose to provide leisure 
services to non-disabled persons, “the ADA requires that the City 
provide equal opportunit[ies] for persons with disabilities to receive 
comparable benefits.”212  Thus, the ADA clearly prohibits the 
 
204 Dreher Park, 846 F. Supp. at 988. 
205 Id. at 989.  
206 Id.  Recreational programs cut included summer day camps for disabled children, 
adventure clubs for children with varying disabilities, social programs for visually-impaired 
and blind adults and teenagers, programs for siblings of those with disabilities, a lip reading 
instruction program, and more.  Id. at 988.  
207 Id. at 989.  
208 Id. at 991 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d)).   
209 Id.  
210 Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(iv)).  
211 Id. at 992. 
212 Id.  
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exclusion of persons with disabilities from meaningful participation in 
programs and services when local and state governments are facing 
budget deficits.213  
The ADA strongly mandates inclusion rather than exclusion, 
but separate programs may prove to be necessary to meet the mission 
of providing persons with disabilities certain recreational programs.214  
However, without funding to provide for these separate programs, the 
promise of inclusion rings hollow.  
This “necessity exception” has sometimes been used to justify 
discrimination.  Fortunately, courts have largely rejected this 
argument.215  In Burns-Vidlak ex rel. Burns v. Chandler, a challenge 
was brought on behalf of blind and disabled individuals who claimed 
they were being excluded from participation in Hawaii’s pilot program 
for integrating preexisting health care plans.216  The court focused on 
the ADA’s narrow exception that so-called discrimination is permitted 
only when “necessary.”217  A public entity is prohibited from imposing 
“eligibility criteria that screen out . . . [individuals with disabilities], 
unless such criteria can be shown to be necessary for the provision of 
the service, program or activity offered.”218  The court rejected as a 
matter of law the State’s claim that the proposed healthcare program 
does not violate the ADA “because it is ‘necessary’ to exclude disabled 
individuals to ensure the financial viability of the program.”219  This 
categorical exclusion from participation was appropriately rejected by 
the court.  
In Lovell v. Chandler, a later challenge to the same Hawaii 
healthcare program, disabled persons again argued that they were 
wrongfully excluded from participating in the program.220  The court 
focused its discussion on providing different or separate benefits “if 
‘such action is necessary to provide qualified individuals with 
disabilities with aids, benefits, or services that are as effective as those 
provided to others.’”221  The court held that the “‘different and 
 
213 See supra notes 204-212 and accompanying text.  
214 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(iv) (2018). 
215 See infra notes 216-24 and accompanying text.  
216 939 F. Supp. 765, 767-68 (D. Haw. 1996). 
217 Id. at 769-70 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8)).  
218 Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8)). 
219 Id. at 772.  
220 303 F.3d 1039, 1045-46 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that the ADA prohibits overt denials of 
equal treatment of individuals with disabilities).  
221 Id. at 1055 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(iv)).  
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separate’ benefit the State provided was no benefit at all.”222  Thus, 
“the State cannot avoid liability under the ‘necessity’ exception.”223  
The ADA mandates that entities providing benefits for persons with 
disabilities in an inclusive setting, or, when necessary, in a separate 
setting, must be as effective as those services provided to others.224  
Different or separate clearly does not mean the absence of benefits, but 
rather services that are as effective as those provided to all citizens.  
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS  
In order to respect the important liberty interests at stake for 
persons with disabilities, it is imperative that the least restrictive 
alternative is a central and guiding principle in a variety of settings 
including community based mental health treatment, housing options, 
appropriate educational settings and in all places of public 
accommodations and government entities.  For individuals with mental 
or physical disabilities who seek the “right to fully participate in all 
aspects of society,”225 from “employment, housing, public 
accommodations, education, transportation, communication, 
recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to 
services,” the ADA compels equality of opportunity, full participation, 
independent living, and economic self-sufficiency.226  The following 
are recommendations to guide state legislatures and private entities, 
school officials, policymakers, and everyday individuals in 
developing, implementing, and participating fully in an enlightened, 
humane, and fair society, including those with mental or physical 
disabilities in our nation: 
1. In special education placement decisions, begin the 
conversation on the appropriate setting with placement primarily in the 
regular classroom setting for the majority of the day, and placement in 
a specialized education classroom setting for part of the day.  
Movement to a more or less restrictive setting along the cascade of 
alternatives will depend on the decisions made at the IEP conference.  
 
222 Id.  
223 Id.  See Messier v. Southbury Training Sch., 562 F. Supp. 2d 294 (D. Conn. 2008) 
(pertaining to residents of a state-run institution for the mentally disabled who claimed a 
violation of the ADA for the failure to place them in community based residential settings).  
224 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(iv) (2018).  
225 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2018).  
226 Id. § 12101(a)(3).  
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2. When making an educational placement decision for a 
student who is deaf or hard of hearing, the primary factor shall be 
providing significant opportunities for receiving an education with 
other students with similar disabilities, and such placement shall take 
priority over education in the regular classroom with non-disabled 
students.  
3. In the civil commitment context, amend the state law criteria 
for in-patient hospitalization to require a showing that there is no less 
restrictive form of intervention that is appropriate and consistent with 
the welfare and safety of the individual, removing from most state 
statutes the additional “availability” clause.227  
4. Explicitly place the burden in the civil commitment 
proceedings on the moving party seeking involuntary hospitalization 
to show that there is no appropriate less restrictive form of intervention 
that is consistent with the welfare and safety of the individual.228  
5. Coordinate mental health funding at the federal, state, and 
local levels with a goal of offering community based outpatient mental 
health treatment services to all those in need.  Increase total funding 
for such services by 50% over the next decade.  
6. Require a coordinated effort between psychiatric hospitals 
and community mental health service providers to create and fund 
community based mental health treatment services to identify those 
services currently available in the community.  
7. Raise the burden of proof to beyond a reasonable doubt in 
involuntary civil commitment hearings, or, at a minimum, on the 
criterion that there is no less restrictive form of intervention that is 
consistent with the welfare and safety of the individual, rather than the 
clear and convincing standard currently in place in a vast majority of 
state civil commitment statutes.  
8. Continue to include the least restrictive alternative doctrine 
in guardianship laws, termination of parental rights laws, and assisted 
outpatient treatment statutes.  
9. Support the principle that, as a society, we should provide 
greater protections to the mentally ill, ensuring that involuntary 
 
227 See supra Section IV.B; see also infra Appendix A.  
228 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-925(1) (“The state has the burden to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that . . . neither voluntary hospitalization nor other treatment alternatives 
less restrictive of the subject’s liberty than inpatient or outpatient treatment ordered by the 
mental health board are available or would suffice to prevent the harm.”).  
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inpatient confinement is truly a last resort when all less restrictive 
forms of intervention are inappropriate.  
10. Mandate each state mental health agency to create and fund 
additional community based treatment and housing alternatives for all 
persons facing involuntary civil commitment. Requiring the state to 
provide a written discharge plan including outpatient mental health 
care and housing to the administrative law judge hearing the civil 
commitment of a person facing involuntary admission into a 
psychiatric facility within 10 days of said person being initially 
admitted to a facility on an observational status.  
VIII. CONCLUSION  
The least restrictive environment, the guiding principle for 
education and treatment and acceptance of persons with disabilities, is 
here to stay.  Revisiting and reevaluating the concept will lead to even 
greater acceptance of persons with disabilities into the mainstream of 
society.  Forcing government officials to expand funding, think and act 
creatively, and consider a variety of alternatives in the mental health 
and special education arenas will benefit all of society.  
There is clearly a recognition of the importance of inclusion 
and mainstreaming of disabled individuals into all aspects of society.  
Isolation and exclusion have hopefully given way to a more 
enlightened society, and with more acceptance of individuals who are 
viewed as different.  The provision of services ranging from education, 
treatment, housing, and participating in programs and activities offered 
in the least restrictive environment continues to guide the disability 
advocacy movement.  
One must continue to examine the significance that the LRE 
has on the design of an appropriate education, treatment, housing, and 
services or programs offered to individuals with disabilities.  We as a 
society must not default to the LRE simply out of convenience when it 
is often the least expensive alternative to fund.  The prominent cascade 
of alternatives in education, treatment, housing, and services must be 
the approach.  We must continue to respect individual choice and 
independent decision-making authority.  One size fits all should never 
be the approach in serving disabled children, adults with mental illness, 
or deaf or physically disabled individuals.  
Whether the concept is called “the less restrictive form of 
intervention,” “less drastic means,” “least restrictive environment,” 
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“least restrictive alternative,” “least restrictive appropriate setting,” 
“least restrictive treatment alternative,” or “least restrictive alternative 
mode of treatment,” what is clear is the desire of all of us to be 
unwavering in our desire to experience equality of opportunity, full 
participation, independent living, and to be left free of government 
intrusion and constraint.  Let us all make the LRE more than an empty 
mandate by removing frustrations and opening up the dialogue to the 
endless possibilities a society that steeps in the LRE concept can bring 
about. 
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APPENDIX A 
THE LRE IN CIVIL COMMITMENT STATUTES: A STATE BY 
STATE GUIDE 
 
State Statute Statutory Language  Statutory 
Definition 
Provided? 
Alabama ALA. CODE § 
22-52-10.1 
(2019) 
The least restrictive 
alternative necessary 
and available for the 
treatment of the 
respondent’s mental 
illness shall be ordered. 
 
None 
Alaska ALASKA STAT. 
§ 47.30.755(b) 
(2019) 
If the court finds that 
there is a less restrictive 
alternative available and 
that the respondent has 
been advised of and 
refused voluntary 
treatment through the 
alternative, the court may 
order the less restrictive 
alternative treatment 
after acceptance by the 
program of the respondent 
for a period not to exceed 
90 days. 
 
ALASKA STAT. § 
47.30.915(11) (2019): 
“[L]east restrictive 
alternative” means 
mental health 
treatment facilities and 
conditions of treatment 
that 
(A)  are no more 
harsh, hazardous, or 
intrusive than 
necessary to achieve 
the treatment 
objectives of the 
patient; and 
(B)  involve no 
restrictions on physical 
movement nor 
supervised residence 
or inpatient care 
except as reasonably 
necessary for the 
administration of 
treatment or the 
protection of the 
patient or others from 
physical injury[.] 
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Arizona ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. 
§ 36-540(B) 
(2019) 
 
The court shall consider all 
available and 
appropriate alternatives 
for the treatment and care 
of the patient. The court 
shall order the least 
restrictive treatment 
alternative available. 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 36-501(21) 
(2019):  
“Least restrictive 
treatment alternative” 
means the treatment 
plan and setting that 
infringe in the least 
possible degree with 
the patient’s right to 
liberty and that are 
consistent with 
providing needed 
treatment in a safe 
and humane manner. 
 
Arkansas ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 20-
47-214(c) 
(2019) 
 
This section shall be 
construed to allow the 
person sought to be 
involuntarily admitted to 
request treatment under an 
alternative least restrictive 
appropriate setting. 
 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 
20-47-202(11) 
(2019): 
 “Least restrictive 
appropriate setting” 
for treatment means 
the available 
treatment setting 
which provides the 
person with the 
highest likelihood of 
improvement or cure 
and which is not 
more restrictive of 
the person’s physical 
or social liberties 
than is necessary for 
the most effective 
treatment of the 
person and for 
adequate protection 
against any dangers 
which the person 
poses to himself or 
herself or others[.] 
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California CAL. WELF. 
& INST. 
CODE § 
6509(a) 
(West 
2019) 
 
If the court finds that the person has a 
developmental disability, and is a 
danger to himself, herself, or to others, 
the court may make an order that the 
person be committed to the State 
Department of Developmental Services 
for suitable treatment and habilitation 
services. Suitable treatment and 
habilitation services is defined as the 
least restrictive residential placement 
necessary to achieve the purposes of 
treatment. 
 
None 
Colorado COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 27-
65-
116(1)(a) 
(2019) 
Any person receiving evaluation or 
treatment under any of the provisions 
of this article is entitled to medical and 
psychiatric care and treatment, with 
regard to services listed in section 27-
66-101 and services listed in rules 
authorized by section 27-66-102, suited 
to meet his or her individual needs, 
delivered in such a way as to keep 
him or her in the least restrictive 
environment, and delivered in such a 
way as to include the opportunity for 
participation of family members in his 
or her program of care and treatment 
when appropriate, all subject to 
available appropriations 
 
None 
Connecticut CONN. 
GEN. STAT. 
§ 17a-
498(c)(3) 
(2019) 
If the court finds by clear and 
convincing evidence that the 
respondent has psychiatric disabilities 
and is dangerous to himself or herself 
or others or gravely disabled, the court 
shall make an order for his or her 
commitment, considering whether or 
not a less restrictive placement is 
available, to a hospital for psychiatric 
disabilities to be named in such order, 
there to be confined for the period of 
the duration of such psychiatric 
disabilities or until he or she is 
discharged or converted to voluntary 
status pursuant to section 17a-506 in 
due course of law. 
 
None 
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Delaware DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit.16, 
§ 5005(a) 
(2019) 
At the completion of the emergency 
detention period, the person shall not 
be admitted to a hospital except 
pursuant to the written certification of a 
psychiatrist that based upon the 
psychiatrist’s examination of such 
person: 
(1) Appears to be a person with a 
mental condition; 
(2) The person has been offered 
voluntary inpatient treatment and has 
declined such care and treatment or 
lacks the capacity to knowingly and 
voluntarily consent to such care and 
treatment; 
(3) As a result of the person’s apparent 
mental condition, the person poses a 
present threat, based upon manifest 
indications, of being dangerous to self 
or dangerous to others; and 
(4) Less restrictive alternatives have 
been considered and determined to 
be clinically inappropriate at the 
present time. 
 
None 
District of 
Columbia  
D.C. CODE 
§ 21-
545(b)(2) 
(2019) 
If the Court or jury finds that the 
person is mentally ill and, because of 
that mental illness, is likely to injure 
himself or others if not committed, the 
Court may order the person’s 
commitment to the Department or to 
any other facility, hospital, or mental 
health provider that the Court believes 
is the least restrictive alternative 
consistent with the best interests of 
the person and the public. An order 
of commitment issued pursuant to this 
paragraph shall be for a period of one 
year. 
None 
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Florida  
 
 
FLA. STAT. § 
394.467(1)(b) 
(2019) 
A person may be 
ordered for 
involuntary inpatient 
placement for 
treatment upon a 
finding of the court 
by clear and 
convincing evidence 
that . . . [a]ll 
available less 
restrictive treatment 
alternatives that 
would offer an 
opportunity for 
improvement of his 
or her condition have 
been judged to be 
inappropriate. 
None 
Georgia GA. CODE 
ANN. § 37-4-
121 (2019) 
 
It is the policy of the 
state that the least 
restrictive 
alternative 
placement be secured 
for every client at 
every stage of his 
habilitation. It shall 
be the duty of the 
facility to assist the 
client in securing 
placement in non-
institutional 
community facilities 
and programs. 
 
GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-1 
(2019): 
“Least restrictive 
alternative,” “least 
restrictive environment,” 
or “least restrictive 
appropriate care and 
treatment” means that 
which is the least 
restrictive available 
alternative, environment, 
or care and treatment, 
respectively, within the 
limits of state funds 
specifically appropriated 
therefor. 
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Hawaii HAW. 
REV. 
STAT. § 
334-60.2 
(2019) 
A person may be committed to a psychiatric 
facility for involuntary hospitalization, if the 
court finds: 
(1) That the person is mentally ill or suffering 
from substance abuse; 
(2) That the person is imminently dangerous to 
self or others; and     
(3) That the person is in need of care or 
treatment, or both, and there is no suitable 
alternative available through existing 
facilities and programs which would be less 
restrictive than hospitalization. 
 
None 
Idaho IDAHO 
CODE § 
66-
329(11) 
(2019) 
[T]he court shall order the proposed patient 
committed to the custody of the department 
director for observation, care and treatment for 
an indeterminate period of time not to exceed 
one (1) year. The department director, through 
his dispositioner, shall determine within twenty-
four (24) hours the least restrictive available 
facility or outpatient treatment, consistent 
with the needs of each patient committed under 
this section for observation, care, and treatment. 
 
None 
Illinois  405 ILL. 
COMP. 
STAT. 5/3-
811(a) 
(2019) 
 
If any person is found subject to involuntary 
admission on an inpatient basis, the court shall 
consider alternative mental health facilities 
which are appropriate for and available to the 
respondent, including but not limited to 
hospitalization. The court may order the 
respondent to undergo a program of 
hospitalization in a mental health facility 
designated by the Department, in a licensed 
private hospital or private mental health facility 
if it agrees, or in a facility of the United States 
Veterans Administration if it agrees. If any 
person is found subject to involuntary admission 
on an outpatient basis, the court may order the 
respondent to undergo a program of alternative 
treatment; or the court may place the respondent 
in the care and custody of a relative or other 
person willing and able to properly care for him 
or her. The court shall order the least restrictive 
alternative for treatment which is 
appropriate. 
 
None 
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Indiana See 
generally  
IND. CODE 
§ 12-26 
(2019) 
Consideration of LRE not explicitly required by 
civil commitment statute (IND. CODE § 12-26-6) 
Note: LRE standard for commitment adopted by 
case law as “least restrictive environment 
suitable for [] treatment.” In re Commitment of 
T.K. v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, 993 N.E.2d 
245, 251 (Ind. 2013). LRE standard is  present 
only in statute regarding suitability of facility: 
“The court may order temporary placement of 
the individual in the least restrictive suitable 
facility pending admission to a facility.” IND. 
CODE § 12-26-10-2 (2019). 
None 
Iowa See IOWA 
CODE R.  
13.24 
Consideration of LRE not explicitly required by 
civil commitment statute (IOWA CODE § 299). 
The most relevant mention in Evaluation report 
court rules (IOWA CODE R. 13.24) is: “The 
evaluation also shall specify the basis for the 
attending physician’s conclusions concerning 
recommended treatment and the basis for the 
judgment that the recommended treatment is the 
least restrictive alternative possible for the 
respondent pursuant to options (1), (2), (3), or 
(4) of Iowa Code section 125.84.” 
None 
Kansas KAN. 
STAT. 
ANN. § 
59-
2961(b) 
(2019) 
Such report shall state that the examiner has 
made an examination of the proposed patient 
and shall state the opinion of the examiner on 
the issue of whether or not the proposed patient 
is a mentally ill person subject to involuntary 
commitment for care and treatment under the act 
and the examiner’s opinion as to the least 
restrictive treatment alternative which will 
protect the proposed patient and others and 
allow for the improvement of the proposed 
patient if treatment is ordered. 
None 
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Kentucky KY. REV. 
STAT. 
ANN. § 
202B.040 
(West 
2019) 
 
 
 
 
When a person who is alleged 
to be an individual with an 
intellectual disability is 
involuntarily admitted, there 
shall be a determination that: 
(1) The person is an individual 
with an intellectual disability; 
(2) The person presents a 
danger or a threat of danger to 
self, family, or others; 
(3) The least restrictive 
alternative mode of 
treatment presently available 
requires placement in an 
ICF/ID; and 
(4) Treatment that can 
reasonably benefit the person is 
available in an ICF/ID. 
 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 202B.010 (West 
2019): 
“Least restrictive 
alternative mode of 
treatment” means that 
treatment given in the 
least confining setting 
which will provide an 
individual with an 
intellectual disability 
appropriate treatment 
or care consistent with 
accepted professional 
practice. For purposes 
of this section, least 
restrictive alternative 
mode of treatment 
may include an 
institutional 
placement[.] 
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Louisiana LA. STAT. 
ANN. § 
28:55(e)(1) 
(2019) 
If the court finds by clear and convincing 
evidence that the respondent is dangerous to 
self or others or is gravely disabled, as a 
result of a substance-related or addictive 
disorder or mental illness, it shall render a 
judgment for his commitment. After 
considering all relevant circumstances, 
including clinical recommendations and any 
preference of the respondent or his family, 
the court shall determine whether the 
respondent should be committed to a 
treatment facility which is medically 
suitable and least restrictive of the 
respondent’s liberty. However, if the 
placement determined by the court is 
unavailable, the court may commit the 
respondent to the Louisiana Department of 
Health for appropriate placement subject 
to availability of department resources 
until such time as an opening is available 
for transfer to the treatment facility 
determined by the court. If the department 
is not the petitioner, the parties shall first 
consult with the department or its counsel 
before entering into a judgment stipulating 
to a commitment of the respondent to the 
department. 
None 
Maine ME. STAT. 
tit. 34-B, § 
3864(5)(E) 
(2019) 
In addition to proving that the patient is a 
mentally ill individual, the applicant must 
show: 
(1) By evidence of the patient’s recent 
actions and behavior, that due to the 
patient’s mental illness the patient poses a 
likelihood of serious harm; and 
(2) That, after full consideration of less 
restrictive treatment settings and 
modalities, inpatient hospitalization is the 
best available means for the treatment of 
the person. 
None 
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Maryland MD. CODE 
ANN., 
HEALTH-
GEN. § 10-
632(e) 
(2019) 
The hearing officer shall . . . order the 
release of the individual from the facility 
unless the record demonstrates by clear and 
convincing evidence that at the time of the 
hearing each of the following elements exist 
as to the individual whose involuntary 
admission is sought: 
(i) The individual has a mental disorder; 
(ii) The individual needs in-patient care or 
treatment; 
(iii) The individual presents a danger to the 
life or safety of the individual or of others; 
(iv) The individual is unable or unwilling to 
be voluntarily admitted to the facility; 
(v) There is no available less restrictive 
form of intervention that is consistent 
with the welfare and safety of the 
individual[.] 
None 
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Massachusetts See MASS. 
ABUSE 
PREVENTION 
PROCEEDING 
GUIDELINE 
10:06 
Consideration of LRE not directly 
required by civil commitment statute 
(MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 123, § 12 
(2019)) 
The most relevant mention in 
Commentary on proceeding guidelines 
(MASS. ABUSE PREVENTION 
PROCEEDING GUIDELINE 10:06) is: 
“On occasion, the behavior of a party 
involved in a c. 209A action is such 
that involuntary civil commitment may 
be appropriate. The standard for such 
commitment is: (1) the party suffers 
from a ‘mental illness,’ which for the 
purposes of involuntary commitment is 
defined as ‘a substantial disorder of 
thought, mood, perception, orientation, 
or memory which grossly impairs 
judgment, behavior, capacity to 
recognize reality or ability to meet the 
ordinary demands of life, but shall not 
include alcoholism or substance abuse 
which is defined in G.L. c. 123, § 35,’ 
104 Code Mass. Regs. § 27.05(1) 
(promulgated by the Department of 
Mental Health); (2) poses a danger of 
serious harm, either to the person 
himself or to others; and (3) there is no 
less restrictive alternative to 
commitment available.”  
None 
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Michigan MICH. 
COMP. 
LAWS § 
330.1708(3) 
(2019) 
Mental health services shall be offered in 
the least restrictive setting that is 
appropriate and available. 
None 
Minnesota MINN. 
STAT. § 
253B.18(a) 
(2019 
The court shall commit the patient to a 
secure treatment facility unless the patient 
establishes by clear and convincing 
evidence that a less restrictive treatment 
program is available that is consistent 
with the patient’s treatment needs and the 
requirements of public safety. 
None 
Mississippi MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 41-
21-73(6) 
(2019) 
The court shall state the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law that constitute the 
basis for the order of commitment. The 
findings shall include a listing of less 
restrictive alternatives considered by the 
court and the reasons that each was found 
not suitable. 
None 
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Missouri MO. REV. 
STAT. § 
632.350(5) 
(2019) 
 
At the conclusion of the 
hearing, if the court or 
jury finds that the 
respondent, as the result of 
mental illness, presents a 
likelihood of serious harm 
to himself or to others, and 
the court finds that a 
program appropriate to 
handle the respondent’s 
condition has agreed to 
accept him, the court shall 
order the respondent to be 
detained for involuntary 
treatment in the least 
restrictive environment 
for a period not to exceed 
ninety days or for 
outpatient detention and 
treatment under the 
supervision of a mental 
health program in the least 
restrictive environment 
for a period not to exceed 
one hundred eighty days. 
 
MO. REV. STAT. § 
630.005 (2019): 
 “Least restrictive 
environment”, a 
reasonably available 
setting or mental health 
program where care, 
treatment, habilitation 
or rehabilitation is 
particularly suited to 
the level and quality of 
services necessary to 
implement a person’s 
individualized 
treatment, habilitation 
or rehabilitation plan 
and to enable the 
person to maximize his 
or her functioning 
potential to participate 
as freely as feasible in 
normal living 
activities, giving due 
consideration to 
potentially harmful 
effects on the person 
and the safety of other 
facility or program 
clients and public 
safety 
Montana MONT. 
CODE ANN. 
§ 53-21-
120(1) 
(2019) 
A person detained 
pursuant to this part must 
be detained in the least 
restrictive environment 
required to protect the 
life and physical safety of 
the person detained or 
members of the public; in 
this respect, prevention of 
significant injury to 
property may be 
considered. 
None 
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Nebraska NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 71-
925(1) (2019) 
The state has the burden to 
prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that (a) 
the subject is mentally ill and 
dangerous and (b) neither 
voluntary hospitalization nor 
other treatment alternatives 
less restrictive of the 
subject’s liberty than 
inpatient or outpatient 
treatment ordered by the 
mental health board are 
available or would suffice to 
prevent the harm. 
None 
Nevada NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 
433A.310(6) 
(2019) 
Before issuing an order for 
involuntary admission or a 
renewal thereof, the court 
shall explore other alternative 
courses of treatment within 
the least restrictive 
appropriate environment, 
including involuntary 
admission to a program of 
community-based or 
outpatient services, as 
suggested by the evaluation 
team who evaluated the 
person, or other persons 
professionally qualified in the 
field of psychiatric mental 
health, which the court 
believes may be in the best 
interests of the person. 
None 
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New 
Hampshire 
None Consideration of LRE not directly 
required by involuntary civil 
commitment statute (N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 135-C:27 (2019)) 
The most relevant mention is in 
“Purpose and Policy” provision 
(N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:1): 
“It is the policy of this state 
to provide to persons who are 
severely mentally disabled 
adequate and humane care 
which, to the extent possible 
while meeting the purposes 
of habilitation and treatment, 
is. . . [l]east restrictive of the 
person’s freedom of 
movement and ability to 
function normally in society 
while being appropriate to the 
person’s individual capacity.” 
None 
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New 
Jersey 
N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 
30:4-
27.15a(a) 
(West 2019) 
 
In determining the commitment 
placement, the court shall 
consider the least restrictive 
environment for the patient to 
receive clinically appropriate 
treatment that would ameliorate 
the danger posed by the patient 
and provide the patient with 
appropriate treatment. 
 
 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
30:4-27.2(gg) 
(2019): 
 “Least restrictive 
environment” 
means the 
available setting 
and form of 
treatment that 
appropriately 
addresses a 
person’s need for 
care and the need 
to respond to 
dangers to the 
person, others or 
property and 
respects, to the 
greatest extent 
practicable, the 
person’s interests 
in freedom of 
movement and 
self-direction. 
New 
Mexico 
None Consideration of LRE not 
directly required by involuntary 
civil commitment statute (N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 43-1-11 (2019)). 
The most relevant mention is in 
“Individualized Treatment and 
Habilitation Plans” provision 
(N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-9): 
“Each individualized treatment 
or habilitation plan shall include 
. . . a statement of the least 
restrictive conditions necessary 
to achieve the purposes of 
treatment or habilitation . . . 
[and] criteria for release to less 
restrictive settings for treatment 
or habilitation.” 
None 
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New York None Consideration of LRE not directly required by 
involuntary civil commitment statute for 
inpatient treatment (N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 
9.33 (McKinney 2019)). 
The most relevant mention is in “Assisted 
Outpatient Treatment” provision (N.Y. MENTAL 
HYG. LAW § 9.60(h)(4)): 
“A physician who testifies pursuant to paragraph 
two of this subdivision shall state: (i) the facts 
which support the allegation that the subject 
meets each of the criteria for assisted outpatient 
treatment, (ii) that the treatment is the least 
restrictive alternative . . . .” 
None 
North 
Carolina 
None Consideration of LRE not directly required by 
involuntary civil commitment statute (N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 122C-261 through 280 (2019)). 
The most relevant mention is in “Declaration of 
Policy” provision regarding voluntary 
commitment (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-201): 
“It is further State policy that, except as 
provided in G.S. 122C-212(b), individuals who 
have been voluntarily admitted shall be 
discharged upon application and that 
involuntarily committed individuals shall be 
discharged as soon as a less restrictive mode of 
treatment is appropriate.” 
None 
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North 
Dakota 
N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 25-
01.2-012 (2019) 
 
All individuals with 
developmental disabilities 
have a right to appropriate 
treatment, services, and 
habilitation for those 
disabilities. Treatment, 
services, and habilitation 
for individuals with a 
developmental disability 
must be provided in the 
least restrictive 
appropriate setting. 
 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 
25-01.2-01 (2019):  
 “Least restrictive 
appropriate setting” 
means that setting 
that allows an 
individual with a 
developmental 
disability to 
develop and realize 
the individual’s 
fullest potential and 
enhances the 
individual’s ability 
to cope with the 
individual’s 
environment 
without 
unnecessarily 
curtailing 
fundamental 
personal liberties. 
Ohio OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 
5122.15(E) 
(West 2019) 
 
[C]ourt shall consider the 
diagnosis, prognosis, 
preferences of the 
respondent and the 
projected treatment plan 
for the respondent and 
shall order the 
implementation of the 
least restrictive 
alternative available and 
consistent with 
treatment goals. If the 
court determines that the 
least restrictive 
alternative available 
that is consistent with 
treatment goals is 
inpatient hospitalization, 
the court’s order shall so 
state. 
None 
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Oklahoma OKLA. STAT. tit. 
43A, § 5-
415(E) (2019) 
After the hearing, when the court 
determines the person to be a person 
requiring treatment, the court shall 
order the person to receive the least 
restrictive treatment consistent 
with the treatment needs of the 
person and the safety of the 
person and others.  
(1)The court shall not order 
hospitalization without a thorough 
consideration of available treatment 
alternatives to hospitalization and 
may direct the submission of 
evidence as to the least restrictive 
treatment alternative or may order 
a mental health examination. 
 
None 
Oregon OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 427.306(2) 
(2019) 
The person shall be detained in the 
least restrictive setting consistent 
with the person’s emotional and 
physical needs and the protection 
of others. 
None 
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Pennsylvania  50 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 7304(f) 
(2019) 
Upon a finding by clear and 
convincing evidence that the 
person is severely mentally 
disabled and in need of 
treatment and subject to 
subsection (a), an order shall 
be entered directing treatment 
of the person in an approved 
facility as an inpatient or an 
outpatient, or a combination 
of such treatment as the 
director of the facility shall 
from time to time determine. 
Inpatient treatment shall be 
deemed appropriate only 
after full consideration has 
been given to less restrictive 
alternatives. Investigation of 
treatment alternatives shall 
include consideration of the 
person’s relationship to his 
community and family, his 
employment possibilities, all 
available community 
resources, and guardianship 
services. An order for 
inpatient treatment shall 
include findings on this issue. 
55 PA. CODE 
§ 5100.2 
(2019):  
Least 
restrictive 
alternate —
The least 
restrictive 
placement or 
status 
available and 
appropriate to 
meet the 
needs of the 
patient and 
includes both 
restrictions on 
personal 
liberty and 
the proximity 
of the 
treatment 
facility to the 
person’s 
natural 
environment. 
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Rhode Island 40.1 R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 40.1-5-
8(j) (2019) 
If the court at a final hearing finds by 
clear and convincing evidence that 
the subject of the hearing is in need 
of care and treatment in a facility, 
and is one whose continued 
unsupervised presence in the 
community would, by reason of 
mental disability, create a likelihood 
of serious harm, and that all 
alternatives to certification have 
been investigated and deemed 
unsuitable, it shall issue an order 
committing the person to the custody 
of the director for care and treatment 
or to an appropriate facility. In either 
event, and to the extent practicable, 
the person shall be cared for in a 
facility that imposes the least 
restraint upon the liberty of the 
person consistent with affording 
him or her the care and treatment 
necessary and appropriate to his or 
her condition. No certification shall 
be made under this section unless and 
until full consideration has been 
given by the certifying court to the 
alternatives to in-patient care, 
including, but not limited to, a 
determination of the person’s 
relationship to the community and to 
his or her family, of his or her 
employment possibilities, and of all 
available community resources, 
alternate available living 
arrangements, foster care, 
community residential facilities, 
nursing homes, and other 
convalescent facilities. 
None 
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South 
Carolina 
None Consideration of LRE 
not directly required by 
involuntary civil 
commitment statute (S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 44-17-410). 
None 
South 
Dakota 
S.D. 
CODIFIED 
LAWS § 
27A-10-9.1 
(2019) 
Upon completion of the 
hearing provided in § 27A-
10-8, the board of mental 
illness may order the 
involuntary commitment of 
the person for an initial 
period not to exceed ninety 
days if a majority of the 
board finds by clear and 
convincing evidence, 
supported by written 
findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, that: 
(1) The person meets the 
criteria in § 27A-1-2; 
(2) The person needs and is 
likely to benefit from the 
treatment which is 
proposed; and 
(3) The commitment is to 
the least restrictive 
treatment alternative. 
 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 
27A-1-1(15) (2019): 
“Least restrictive 
treatment alternative, the 
treatment and conditions 
of treatment which, 
separately and in 
combination, are no 
more intrusive or 
restrictive of mental, 
social, or physical 
freedom than necessary 
to achieve a reasonably 
adequate therapeutic 
benefit. In determining 
the least restrictive 
alternative, 
considerations shall 
include the values and 
preferences of the 
patient, the 
environmental 
restrictiveness of 
treatment settings, the 
duration of treatment, the 
physical safety of the 
patient and others, the 
psychological and 
physical restrictiveness 
of treatments, the 
relative risks and 
benefits of treatments to 
the patient, the proximity 
of the treatment program 
to the patient’s 
residence, and the 
availability of family and 
community resources 
and support. 
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Tennessee TENN. CODE. 
ANN. § 33-6-403 
(2019) 
Involuntary civil 
commitment statute 
does not use LRE 
language, but 
incorporates the 
concept. TENN. CODE. 
ANN. § 33-6-403: 
“If and only if . . . all 
available less drastic 
alternatives to 
placement in a hospital 
or treatment resource 
are unsuitable to meet 
the needs of the person . 
. . then [] the person 
may be admitted and 
detained by a hospital 
or treatment resource 
for emergency 
diagnosis, evaluation.” 
None 
Texas TEX. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE 
ANN. § 
571.036(d) 
(2019) 
 
The judge shall order 
the mental health 
services provided in the 
least restrictive 
appropriate setting 
available. 
 
TEX. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 
571.004 (2019):  
“The least restrictive 
appropriate setting 
for the treatment of a 
patient is the 
treatment setting that: 
(1)  is available; 
(2)  provides the 
patient with the 
greatest probability of 
improvement or cure; 
and 
(3)  is no more 
restrictive of the 
patient’s physical or 
social liberties than is 
necessary to provide 
the patient with the 
most effective 
treatment and to 
protect adequately 
against any danger 
the patient poses to 
himself or others” 
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Utah UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 62A-15-
631(16)(d) (West 
2019) 
 
The court shall order commitment 
of a proposed patient who is 18 
years of age or older to a local 
mental health authority if, upon 
completion of the hearing and 
consideration of the information 
presented in accordance with 
Subsection (15)(d), the court finds 
by clear and convincing evidence 
that . . . there is no appropriate 
less-restrictive alternative to a 
court order of commitment[.] 
None 
Vermont VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
18, § 7617(c) 
(2019) 
Involuntary civil commitment 
statute does not use LRE language, 
but incorporates concept. VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 18, § 7617(c): 
“Prior to ordering any course of 
treatment, the court shall determine 
whether there exists an available 
program of treatment for the person 
which is an appropriate alternative 
to hospitalization. The court shall 
not order hospitalization without a 
thorough consideration of available 
alternatives.” 
None 
Virginia  VA. CODE ANN. § 
37.2-817(c) (2019) 
If the judge or special justice finds 
by clear and convincing evidence 
that . . . all available less restrictive 
treatment alternatives to 
involuntary inpatient treatment, 
pursuant to subsection D, that would 
offer an opportunity for the 
improvement of the person’s 
condition have been investigated 
and determined to be 
inappropriate[.] 
None 
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Washington WASH. REV. CODE § 
71.05.230(4)(a)(i)(B)
(ii) (2018) 
 
If involuntary 
detention is sought 
the petition shall state 
facts that support the 
finding that such 
person, as a result of 
a mental disorder or 
substance use 
disorder, presents a 
likelihood of serious 
harm, or is gravely 
disabled and that 
there are no less 
restrictive 
alternatives to 
detention in the best 
interest of such 
person or others. The 
petition shall state 
specifically that less 
restrictive 
alternative 
treatment was 
considered and 
specify why 
treatment less 
restrictive than 
detention is not 
appropriate.  
WASH. REV. 
CODE § 
71.05.020 
(2019): 
“Less restrictive 
alternative 
treatment” means 
a program of 
individualized 
treatment in a 
less restrictive 
setting than 
inpatient 
treatment that 
includes the 
services 
described in 
RCW 71.05.585. 
 
West 
Virginia  
W. VA. CODE § 27-5-
4(k)(1)(D) (2019) 
Whether there is a 
less restrictive 
alternative than 
commitment 
appropriate for the 
individual. The 
burden of proof of 
the lack of a less 
restrictive 
alternative than 
commitment is on the 
person or persons 
seeking the 
commitment of the 
individual. 
None 
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Wisconsin WIS. STAT. § 
51.61(1)(e) 
(2019) 
[E]ach patient shall . . . 
[e]xcept in the case of a 
patient who is admitted 
or transferred under s. 
51.35(3) or 51.37 or 
under ch. 971 or 975, 
have the right to the 
least restrictive 
conditions necessary to 
achieve the purposes of 
admission, commitment 
or protective placement. 
WIS. ADMIN. 
CODE DHS § 
94.02(27): 
“Least restrictive 
treatment” means 
treatment and 
services which 
will best meet the 
patient’s treatment 
and security needs 
and which least 
limit the patient’s 
freedom of choice 
and mobility. 
Wyoming WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 25-10-
110(j) (2019) 
If, upon completion of 
the hearing and 
consideration of the 
record, the court or the 
jury finds by clear and 
convincing evidence that 
the proposed patient is 
mentally ill the court 
shall consider the least 
restrictive and most 
therapeutic 
alternatives. 
 
None 
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APPENDIX B: 
AT-A-GLANCE LRE STATUTORY LANGUAGE  
AL ALA. CODE § 
22-52-10.1 
(2019) 
Least restrictive alternative necessary and available 
AK ALASKA STAT. 
§ 47.30.755(b) 
(2019) 
Less restrictive alternative available 
AZ ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 
36-540(b) 
(2019) 
Least restrictive appropriate setting 
AR ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 20-47-
214(c) (2019) 
Least restrictive treatment alternative available / 
Available and appropriate 
CA CAL. WELF. & 
INST. CODE § 
6509(a) (West 
2019) 
Least restrictive residential placement necessary 
CO COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 27-65-
116(1)(a) 
(2019) 
Least restrictive environment 
CT CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 17a-
498(c)(3) 
(2019) 
Less restrictive placement is available 
DE DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit.16, § 
5005(a) (2019) 
Less restrictive alternatives have been considered 
and determined to be clinically inappropriate 
D.C. D.C. CODE § 
21-545(b)(2) 
(2019) 
Least restrictive alternative consistent with the best 
interests of the person and the public 
FL FLA. STAT. § 
394.467(1)(b) 
(2019) 
Available less restrictive treatment alternatives 
GA GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 37-4-121 
(2019) 
Least restrictive alternative  
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HI HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 334-
60.2 (2019) 
No suitable alternative available through existing 
facilities and programs which would be less restrictive 
than hospitalization 
ID IDAHO CODE § 
66-329(11) 
(2019) 
Least restrictive available facility or outpatient 
treatment 
IL 
 
405 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/3-
811(a) (2019) 
Least restrictive alternative for treatment which is 
appropriate / Appropriate for and available to the 
respondent 
IN None None 
IA See IOWA CODE 
R. 13.24 
Least restrictive alternative possible 
KS KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 59-
2961(b) (2019) 
Least restrictive treatment alternative 
KY KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 
202B.040 (West 
2019) 
Least restrictive alternative mode of treatment presently 
available 
LA LA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 28:55(e)(1) 
(2019) 
Medically suitable and least restrictive of the 
respondent’s liberty / Appropriate placement subject to 
availability of department resources 
ME ME. STAT. tit. 
34-B, § 
3864(5)(E) 
(2019) 
Less restrictive treatment settings and modalities / Best 
available means for treatment 
MD MD. CODE 
ANN., HEALTH-
GEN. § 10-
632(e) (2019) 
No available less restrictive form of intervention 
MA See MASS. 
ABUSE 
PREVENTION 
PROCEEDING 
GUIDELINE 
10:06 
No less restrictive alternative to commitment available 
MI MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 
330.1708(3) 
(2019) 
Least restrictive setting that is appropriate and available 
MN MINN. STAT. § 
253B.18(a) 
(2019) 
Less restrictive treatment program is available 
MS MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 41-21-
73(6) (2019) 
Less restrictive alternatives 
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MO MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 632.350(5) 
(2019) 
Least restrictive environment  
MT MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 53-21-
120(1) (2019) 
Least restrictive environment required to protect the 
life and physical safety 
NE NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 71-
925(1) (2019) 
Treatment alternatives less restrictive of the subject’s 
liberty than inpatient or outpatient treatment ordered by 
the mental health board are available or would suffice 
NV NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 
433A.310(6) 
(2019) 
Least restrictive appropriate environment 
NH None Least restrictive of the person’s freedom of movement 
and ability to function normally in society while being 
appropriate to the person’s individual capacity 
NJ N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 30:4-
27.15a(a) (West 
2019) 
Least restrictive conditions necessary / Less restrictive 
settings 
NM None Less restrictive settings for treatment  
NY See N.Y. 
MENTAL HYG. 
LAW § 9.60 
(McKinney 
2019) 
Least restrictive alternative 
NC See N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 122C-
201 (2019) 
Less restrictive mode of treatment is appropriate 
ND N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 25-
01.2-012 (2019) 
Least restrictive appropriate setting 
OH OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 
5122.15(E) 
(West 2019) 
Least restrictive alternative available and consistent with 
treatment goals 
OK OKLA. STAT. tit. 
43A, § 5-
415(E) (2019) 
Least restrictive treatment consistent with the treatment 
needs of the person and the safety of the person and 
others / Least restrictive treatment alternatives  
OR OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 427.306(2) 
(2019) 
Least restrictive setting consistent with the person’s 
emotional and physical needs and the protection of 
others 
PA 50 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 7304(f) 
(2019) 
Less restrictive alternatives 
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RI 40.1 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 
40.1-5-8(j) (2019) 
All alternatives to certification have been 
investigated and deemed unsuitable / The least 
restraint upon the liberty of the person consistent 
with affording him or her the care and treatment 
necessary and appropriate 
SC None None 
SD S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 
27A-10-9.1 (2019) 
Least restrictive treatment alternative 
TN TENN. CODE. ANN. § 
33-6-403 (2019) 
Available less drastic alternatives 
TX TEX. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 
571.036(d) (2019) 
Least restrictive appropriate setting available 
UT UTAH CODE ANN. § 
62A-15-631(16)(d) 
(West 2019) 
Appropriate less-restrictive alternative 
VT VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, 
§ 7617(c) (2019) 
Available program of treatment for the person 
which is an appropriate alternative to 
hospitalization 
VA VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-
817(c) (2019) 
Available less restrictive treatment alternatives 
WA WASH. REV. CODE § 
71.05.230(4)(a)(i)(B)(ii) 
(2018) 
Less restrictive alternative treatment  
WV W. VA. CODE § 27-5-
4(k)(1)(D) (2019 
Less restrictive alternative 
WI WIS. STAT. § 
51.61(1)(e) (2019) 
Least restrictive conditions necessary 
WY WYO. STAT. ANN. § 25-
10-110(j) (2019) 
Least restrictive and most therapeutic 
alternatives 
 
Note: Not all the LRE language listed on the shorthand chart are direct requirements 
for involuntary commitment.  Relevant mentions included in the commitment statute 
are included here as well (e.g., LRE language related to the choice of facility) 
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